Ida B. Wells and Cheikh Anta Diop Award Recipient for Outstanding Scholarship and Leadership in Africana StudiesThe successful 1776 revolt against British rule in North America has been hailed almost universally as a great step forward for humanity. But the Africans then living in the colonies overwhelmingly sided with the British. In this trailblazing book; Gerald Horne shows that in the prelude to 1776; the abolition of slavery seemed all but inevitable in London; delighting Africans as much as it outraged slaveholders; and sparking the colonial revolt. Prior to 1776; anti-slavery sentiments were deepening throughout Britain and in the Caribbean; rebellious Africans were in revolt. For European colonists in America; the major threat to their security was a foreign invasion combined with an insurrection of the enslaved. It was a real and threatening possibility that London would impose abolition throughout the colonies—a possibility the founding fathers feared would bring slave rebellions to their shores. To forestall it; they went to war. The so-called Revolutionary War; Horne writes; was in part a counter-revolution; a conservative movement that the founding fathers fought in order to preserve their right to enslave others. The Counter-Revolution of 1776 brings us to a radical new understanding of the traditional heroic creation myth of the United States.
#1732674 in Books Ingramcontent 2012-06-29Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.00 x .42 x 6.00l; .57 #File Name: 1478160489186 pagesAdvising Indigenous Forces American Advisors in Korea Vietnam and El Salvador Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Four StarsBy Juan E. DavilaGood0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy FrogmanVery informative book4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. Hard Lessons Learned That Were Soon ForgottenBy John Lopez Jr.I can really speak only about the chapter covering our efforts in advising the El Salvadorean Armed Forces (ESAF) during the civil war there. I was a participant in those efforts in the last seven months of the war and the first five months of the peace. The trouble with understanding that war was that it was constantly evolving. The USMILGROUP Commander at that time; COL Mark Hamilton (now MG; Retired); once told us that one can speak authoritatively only about the time they spent in country and the part of the war they participated in. My part was serving as the senior advisor to the National Training Center (CEMFA) just outside of La Union. Located in the eastern corner of the country where the borders of El Salvador; Nicaragua and Honduras come together; it was a constant hot spot throughout the war.The only problem I have with this book is that it gives the false impression we performed miracles with only 55 US advisors. This is very misleading. There was no legislation that dictated that we could only use 55 advisors. This was an informal agreement between the Reagan White House and the Democratically controlled and very hostile Congress that was looking for any excuse to cut aid and let the country fall to the Communist FMLN. In actuality; we were augmented by numerous other advisors and support personnel who were never counted against the 55. These included:- US Army Advisors to the logistics; ordnance; administrative and medical departments of the ESAF.- The US Air Force advisors and US Army mechanics that worked with the Salvadorean Air Force in operating and maintaining a fleet of aircraft that included A-37 attack-bombers; AC-47 gunships; UH-1H and UH-1M helicopters.- We also had a very robust joint intelligence gathering organization that performed everything from analysis of documents and interrogation reports to signals intercept.- The large Military Attache section assigned to the US Embassy that was not included in the MILGROUP totals.- The thirty-some helicopter crews and support personnel who provided the advisors invaluable transportation and resupply runs with their three UH-1Hs.- The Special Forces A-Teams and US Navy Seal Teams from Panama that formed the MTTs that were TDY for 60 and 90 day tours to assist our efforts.- The US Navy advisors and mechanics that supported the ESAF's riverine and sea interdiction efforts.- The Psyop advisor augmented by Psyop; Civil Affairs and Medical Civic Action teams that were in country for 30 and 60 day TDYs.- The Corps of Engineers that oversaw the many force protection and security contruction projects. This team also supervised US Army engineers; USN Seabees and civilian contractors that worked on these projects while on 30; 60 and 90 day TDYs.- The CIA and their covert contractors.In 1991; Senator Ted Kennedy demanded an accounting of all US personnel assigned to El Salvador. I have a copy of the white paper prepared by the MILGROUP and presented to his staff that listed almost 550 US military personnel in country in 1991 and listed their duties and responsibilities. Fortunately; the Tail Hook Scandal and the Clarence Thomas nomination took his attention away from us and the information; as far as I know; was never acted on.In addition; the ESAF was further assisted by advisors from Argentina (until 1983); whom they had respect for and had strong military ties with and Israel; who provided quite a bit of military aid and assistance. I never found out whether we were indirectly funding those efforts.So; while just 55 US Soldiers and Marines provided direct advisory support to combat operations; it took another 500 or so US military personnel providing critical advice and support to key elements of the ESAF that made them a more professional military. We 55 could not possibly have accomplished what we did without all these other advisory and support efforts. As one of the 55; I firmly believe they deserve the recognition for this.Our legacy is two fold. We trained the good; the bad and the ugly and turned them into a professional army by the time the war ended in 1992. This was not a perfect army; but a far better one than what they started off with in 1979. Though initially considered mutually exclusive; the advisors took on the task of monitoring human rights violations in addition to their duties as advisors and tried to put a stop to these violations; violations; I might add; that were committed by both sides.However; as in previous wars that involved the US advising indigenous armies; we did not learn from those efforts. The lessons of Vietnam were forgotten; mis-applied or ignored during our fight in El Salvador; and our efforts in El Salvador seemed to have been lost to an Army that is presently trying to find an effective way to advise the armies of Iraq and Afghanistan. MG Hamilton later served in Somalia where he applied some of the lessons he learned in El Salvador. He came very close to winning the support of the Somali clans to include the one belonging to General Adid. However; his efforts were curtailed when the U.N. assumed control of the humanitarian effort there; and the rest is history.The greatest honor bestowed on the Americans that served in that war was not from the beneficiaries of our efforts; but from the opposition. When the Bush Administration announced in 1992 their intention of drawing down US military personnel in country; only the FMLN objected. Their reasons? We were the only honest people left in that country that they could trust.
