DOC Against Liberalism by John Kekes in History

Review

15 of 28 people found the following review helpful. worth reading for liberalsBy A ReaderThis book is worth reading for liberals and conservatives alike. I'm not; in the end; convinced that Kekes has made his case against liberalism. (I think that liberals can answer all of his charges) but he presents interesting challanges that liberals must consider. He's much more rigerous than most conservatives and actual makes arguments rather than just fighting staw men or expressing his own opinion. It's a good book both for liberals; to see what a sophisticated conservative challange to liberalism looks like; and also for conservatives who are dissatisfied with the relatively simple-minded views of someone like Kristol or Buckley (anyone who thinks that Rush Limbaugh is worth listening too will probably not be smart enough to get the book!)4 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Exposing Inconsistencies with Liberalism (on Many Levels).By Kevin Currie-KnightFirst; I should say that people should read Kekes is only because he does what philosophers should. He writes in a clear way and he spends the lion's share of his time doing original philosophy (rather than citing other writers and getting into narrow academic technicalities). And; here; he questions - as good philosophers should - a position that is seldom questioned (especially from his unique conservative vantage point).Now; the argument. John Kekes's aim is to challenge the conceptual coherence of liberalism - mostly 'left liberalism' - on many fronts. First; liberals tend to value personal autonomy over other values; suggesting that most evil acts are the products of non autonomous action and that crime is mostly a problem of people not having full autonomy. (Notice that liberals have often tended to look at crime and poverty as things largely fixable by changing environmental causes; and focus on rehabilitation of criminals more than punishment.) Kekes does not deny that crime and poverty do often flow from people not being autonomous; but suggests that liberals faith in the power of autonomy is over-stated. Why do we suppose that autonomy will lead to more goodness? Can't autonomous people use their autonomy just as easily to commit cleverer crimes; 'milk the system;' and other bad acts? Increasing autonomy among people might lead to more good acts and fewer bad ones; but this is a faith that; Kekes says; is grounded in a view of humans' innate goodness unsupported by fact. (To Plato's question; why think that those who know the good WILL do the good?)Kekes also attacks liberalism's frequent belief in group responsibility (the rich are responsible for taking care of the poor; whites are responsible for 'reparations' to atone for slavery; etc). More specifically; he is attacking this idea as inconsistent with liberals (often simulteneously held) belief that we can only hold people accountable for THEIR autonomous actions. Just as someone may want to exonerate x from punishment because; prior to the crime; he had a horrendous childhood; shouldn't we also exhonerate x white person from paying reparations to atone for someone else's crimes of the past? Again; Kekes is not arguing against the idea of group responsibility (he suggests it is legitimate in certain cases); but only questioning whether one can hold both of these beliefs - in personal responsibility and group rights - coherently at the same time.Kekes also questions - and denies - that one can coherently be a liberal and a pluralist at the same time; as many liberals (William Galston; George Crowder; Isaiah Berlin) want to do. If one is a liberal; then one must value autonomy over other values; and suggest that ways of life not autonomously chosen shall not be permissible in a liberal politic. Yet; if one is a pluralist; then autonomy becomes one of many values that CAN be overriden by other values in certain cases. If liberals accept pluralism; then liberal autonomy becomes one value among many (and one must be prepared to accept illiberal ways of life as legitimate). If one values liberalism over pluralism; then one must accept the idea that one is not neutral on the subject of what kind of lives we should 'allow' to be led.I should also mention that there is a really good chapter devoted to problems with Rawls's arguments; particularly those arguing against the notion of desert. If desert is a dead concept (because; says Rawls; everything we do can be traced to some luck factors we did not deserve); then he cannot also argue that the worst off deserve to be made better off (a desert claim). Kekes also suggests that Rawls does not focus anywhere on the problem of what happens; once the rules of society are set by contract; when some people decide to defect from rules (particularly people who came into society after the 'original position').It is the last argument I am least convinced by (even though I personally am on the fence about whether liberalism and pluralism are incompatible). To my mind; and to George Crowder's (see Liberalism and Value Pluralism (Political Theory And Contemporary Politics)); pluralism requires autonomy; because if values clash; the only way to resolve them seems to be by using one's autonomy - one's capacity for choice. To put this a bit differently; let's say that there is an illiberal way of life (say; a faith that requires religious indoctrination to keep everyone feeling a strong sense of community). Now; let's say we want to know if the value of strongly felt community is enough to outweigh the value of autonomy. It is difficult to see how we are going to decide this without; in some sense; asking the people involved to tell us - autonomously! - whether they are happy with their lifestyle and would choose it among rivals. But of course; they cannot; because their community disallows for autonomy. But is there some other way to find out if their way of life is good; other than by appealing to whether members in the society are happy enough to choose that life autonomously? I don't see it. All of this is to say that I am not sure how value pluralism can really be exercised without the idea of liberal autonomy as a non-negotiable value. (This isn't to say they don't conflict per se; but it is to say that if there is a conflict; it is only because autonomy is necessary to save value pluralism.)Of course; what we don't really get in this book is an argument about what should take liberalism's place. That is reserved for Kekes's subsequent A Case for Conservatism. In this book; Kekes's case is wholly a negative one; against liberalism. And it could certainly be objected that Kekes is engaging in straw man arguments or caricatures (he actually cites no liberals who simultaneously believe that both the responsibility requires personal autonomy and that group members can be held responsible for other members acts). I think Kekes's depictions of left-liberalism are more or less accurate; but certainly; there are left-liberals who hold views contra to those Kekes attacks. Either way; this book gives some good challenges; I think; to what Kekes calls "the liberal faith."13 of 18 people found the following review helpful. Autonomy is not enoughBy Kurt J. AckerIn this excellent; clearly-written book; John Kekes argues that Liberalism (not "classical liberalism"; but "60's liberalism") embraces aims that are inconsistent; takes a view of human nature that is naively optimistic; and promotes a conception of equality that is self-defeating. Several of the main points of this book can be summarized as follows:1. According to Kekes; Liberals don't deny that evil is prevalent; but insist on blaming - not human nature; which they assume to be fundamentally good - but factors that interfere with the exercise of free choice; e.g. poverty; tradition; poor education; a harsh environment. Thus their all-purpose remedy for whatever ails the human race is to increase its autonomy. But since autonomous choices are frequently wicked; the remedy is counterproductive. Liberalism thus undercuts effective policy.2. By the same token; since Liberals assume that people behave badly because of factors that limit their automony; and since only fully autonomous acts merit punishment; Liberals are often inclined to exempt evil-doers from moral responsibility. It is not uncommon for Liberals to excuse malefactors whose autonomy has been diminished - by such factors as lousy parenting or poor schools - while at the same time giving short shrift to their innocent victims. Liberalism thus undercuts moral responsibility.3. In the Liberal conception; people are all born with innate goodness and are roughly equal in moral merit. It follows that an unequal distribution of goods is inherently objectionable and that those who are worse off must have been treated unjustly. This kind of egalitarianism alienates Liberals from the bedrock ideal of true justice; which is that people should get what they deserve. In contrast; those who take merit seriously will not find inequality objectionable in itself and are more likely to think that before we can assist those who are worse off; we must consider the possibility that they are to blame for the predicaments they find themselves in. Liberalism resists that approach and thus undercuts justice.Condensed to a single sentence; Kekes teaches that Liberals; starting from premises that are overly optimistic and foolishly egalitarian; have a tendency - in the absence of any empirical evidence - to assume that unequal distribution is unfair; that the poor are victims of injustice; that the poor are not responsible for their bad behavior and that we can improve both individuals and societies by removing all impediments to free choice; from traditional attitudes to lousy education.Kekes explores these issues with great verve and intelligence. The book is recommended both for Conservatives who would like a deeper understanding of Liberalism; as well as broad-minded Liberals; who don't mind challenging their own principles.