An in-depth investigation of the mounting evidence that Atlantis was located in the Bahamas and Caribbean; near Cuba in particular• Explains how Atlantis was destroyed by a comet; the same comet that formed the mysterious Carolina Bays • Reveals evidence of complex urban ruins off the coasts of Cuba and the Bahamas• Shows how pre-Columbian mariners visited the Caribbean and brought back stories of Atlantis’s destruction• Compares Plato’s account with ancient legends from the indigenous people of North and South America; such as the Maya; the Quiché; and the Yuchi of OklahomaThe legend of Atlantis is one of the most intriguing mysteries of all time. Disproving many well-known Atlantis theories and providing a new hypothesis; the evidence for which continues to build; Andrew Collins shows that what Plato recounts is the memory of a major cataclysm at the end of the last Ice Age 13;000 years ago; when a comet devastated the island of Cuba and submerged part of the Bahaman landmass in the Caribbean. He parallels Plato’s account with corroborating ancient myths and legends from the indigenous people of North and South America; such as the Maya of Mesoamerica; the Quiché of Peru; the Yuchi of Oklahoma; the islanders of the Antilles; and the native peoples of Brazil. The author explains how the comet that destroyed Atlantis in the Caribbean was the same comet that formed the mysterious and numerous elliptical depressions; known as the Carolina Bays; found across the mid-Atlantic United States. He reveals evidence of sunken ruins off the coasts of both Cuba and the Bahamas; ancient complexes spanning more than 10 acres that clearly suggest urban development and meticulously planned road systems.Revealing the identity of Plato’s “opposite continent†as ancient America; Collins argues that Plato’s story was first carried back to the Mediterranean world by trans-Atlantic mariners; such as the Phoenicians and Carthaginians; as early as the first millennium BC. He offers additional ancient trans-Atlantis trade evidence from Egyptian mummies; Roman shipwrecks in the Western Atlantic; and the African features of giant stone heads in Mexico. Piecing together the final days of Atlantis and the wildfires; earthquakes; tsunamis; days of darkness; and advancement of ice sheets that followed the ancient comet’s impact; Collins establishes not only that Atlantis did indeed exist but also that remnants of it survive today; most obviously in Cuba; Atlantis’s original central island.
#1181305 in Books Naval Institute Press 2008-11-01Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.22 x .97 x 6.30l; 1.19 #File Name: 1591144485296 pages
Review
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Solid thinking and Conclusions on a little studied slice of inter-war US military thinking.By Norman OwensThis is a specialist naval history of the US Navy’s General Board. The Board was established after the Spanish-American War when the widely disparate performance of US warships in the war came under analysis. The Board was intended to tie together the various bureaus of the navy to get better lateral communication. The board typically had the heads of the different bureaus: Ordnance; Shipbuilding; Docks Yards; the Marines; and; after WW1; Air; plus the Navy Secretary; the CNO (after that post was created); and three mid-rank “up and comersâ€. The War College and CNO had plans so the General Board ended up studying force structure: how best to develop the ships that would conform to the current treaties and carry out the Navy’s plans in time of war. In Mahan’s formulation; the naval power of a nation was based on upon its fleet; the bases available to the fleet; and its merchant marine. After the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference resulted in treaties that forbade the US to develop bases west of Pearl Harbor; the rule of thumb that a naval force lost 10% of its combat power for every 1000 miles that it operated away from its bases meant that despite the 5:3 force superiority assured by the Treaty relative to Japan; the USN could not operate in the western Pacific at anything other than parity since the USN would be far from Pearl and Manila would be presumed to be captured or unusable while the Japanese would have convenient bases in the Home Islands or Formosa. Consequently; the interwar navy spent a lot of time developing cruisers and destroyers with long range and efficient propulsion plants; underway replenishment; and mobile drydocks to permit the most extensive possible repairs to capital ships far from pre-war base facilities. Although an eventual decisive battle ship duel was anticipated in the western Pacific; the Navy recognized that the opening phases of a Pacific conflict would be dominated by cruisers and carriers; since neither side could afford to lose battleships to ambush ahead of the final duel. Therefore; the overall shape of the campaign of was anticipated as an initial campaign of maneuver and attrition of non-battle-line units; much like the historical campaigns in WW2 that saw the Japanese keeping their battleline close to home while the USA repaired its battle line that had been wrecked at Pearl Harbor. Not every notion pushed by the Board prospered. Rigid airships were mothballed as fleet scouts after a head of the Air Bureau; Admiral Moffett; perished in the loss of the USS Macon in the eastern Pacific. The flying deck cruiser was never funded for construction. This was a 10;000 ton cruiser hull with a flight deck on the back half of the ship and an aircraft capacity of 12 -24 planes and a conventional cruiser battery of 9 x 6†rifles forward. The Independence class light carriers and the WW2 escort carrier can both claim descent from this notion of “spreading around†the fleet’s air arm so it would not be tied to a small number of big fleet carriers. The treatment of the topic is first rate. Kuehn is a bit dry with the prose and almost returns to much of the treaty clause forbidding base development in the western Pacific. But the challenge posed by the treaty created a generation of naval officers who had spent years thinking about the specific problems that would face the USN in the Pacific War and results demonstrated that they had successfully anticipated the outlines of the challenges with successful solutions. Overall; this is a good book that informs the student of US naval history or the Second World War in the Pacific.22 of 22 people found the following review helpful. Good ThinkingBy Retired ReaderThis original book is focused on the role that the U.S. Navy General Board had in designing and; to the extent possible; building a U.S. Navy capable of meeting and defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII. The General Board was created in 1900 to advise the Secretary of the Navy on technical matters related to naval ship design; construction; and armament. In practice the Board functioned as a component of what was in all but name the Navy General Staff. The Board was dissolved in 1950 when changing command structures made it redundant.By Kuehn's account the most important service of General Board came during that period of uneasy peace between the end of WWI and the start of WWII. His argument; which he supports quite well; is that in spite of imposed treaty limitations and chronic shortages of funds; the Board cooperated with the Naval War College; the Chief of Naval Operations(CNO); and the Navy Bureaus (e.g. Bureau of Aeronautics) to build a powerful modern navy entirely capable of meeting the challenges of WWII. Perhaps one of the most surprising points he makes is that the Board did not seek consensus; but cooperation and mutually developed solutions to problems involving a wide spectrum of naval issues.During the inter-war period; the General Board was a powerful advocate for a strong navy and was composed at times of the CNO; the President of the Naval war College ; the Chief of Naval Intelligence; and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Remarkably although most senior U.S. Naval Officers at the time were 'battleship men'; the Board consistently demonstrated a clear understanding of vital role that naval aviation would play in future fleet encounters. Probably the most difficult problem that these intelligent and prescient officers had to solve was how to provide the Pacific Fleet with adequate forward support bases in the Western Pacific. Under the Washington Naval Treaty the U.S. was forbidden to build effective; fortified full service naval bases in the Western Pacific or to improve the few existing bases already built there. This forced them to reconsider their strategic (Orange) plans for war with Japan and to develop various innovations to extend the range and effectiveness of the Pacific Fleet. The most far reaching and original of these innovations was the 'Mobile Base Project' (MBP) which incorporated floating dry docks and a carefully crafted logistic support system that proved itself in WWII. All in all not a bad record for the Board or the U.S. Navy.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. I read this mainly for background and I'm glad that I didBy RMacI read this mainly for background and I'm glad that I did. I have done substantial research on Admiral Frank H. Schofield who was on the General Board; was the head of the War Plans Division that revised War Plan Orange and ended his career as Commander in Chief of the fleet.. All of that was between 1921 and 1932 - a time period that Dr. Kuehn covers quite well. My research is mainly based upon thousands of letters written by Schofield and members of his family. I knew that he was opposed to the Washington Disarmament agreements and spoke publicly against them. This book gave me a better understanding of why.
