ebooks Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Grand Alliance; and U.S. Strategy in World War II by Mark A. Stoler in History

Review

1 of 3 people found the following review helpful. School BookBy Clement J PapineauThis book was chosen by the professor for a Master's level Military History class. I found that it met all the expectations and was a good tool for the class.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Fascinating Must Read for Understanding of Current International Security EnvironmentBy NavyTimThe book is incorrectly titled in that at least half of the material deals with planning for post WWII security environment. The birth of the American national security state goes back much further than most realize in that while planning how to win WWI the US military was planning for future war against Germany; Japan and Britain. However it was with WWII that the national security state branched into academics as a willing partner. The Eisenhower "military-industrial complex" has grown into the military-industrial-congressional-academic-media complex. The book does an excellent job in summarizing American national security strategy prior to WWII.Every June 6 when Americans like to pat themselves on the back about saving Europe they should note the comment on pg 188 that " the Red Army between June and September (1944) inflicting nine hundred thousand casualties on the Germans - a figure exceeding by two hundred thousand the total number of troops engaged against Eisenhower's forces." The book made it very clear that the British and to a lesser extent the Americans were eager to let the Soviets and Germans bleed each other out instead of taking on Germany themselves. The Americans were only less eager in that regard because they were very afraid that the Soviets would tire of dying and make a separate peace with Germany. In another shot at the crowd who thinks the only way to defeat "evil" is total military victory should note the discussion had by the JCS that in that event of a separate Soviet/German peace the US would have to accept the German/Soviet dominance of Europe and shift to the Pacific and beat Japan. The delaying of the cross-channel invasion of Europe as Soviets died was a case of criminal neglect. An invasion in southern Vichy France on the Mediterranean coast could have happened before 1944 and would have diverted forces away from the English Channel. The UK preferred North African and eastern Mediterranean operations because those worked to restore the British Empire. Freeing France did nothing to preserve the British Empire. By the time the invasion of Southern France occurred it was too late to make a difference much as the liberation of Mobile occurred too late in the American Civil War.The rampant American racism towards Asians and Russians is also very clear in this book. Senior American Naval commanders like King and Leahy were afraid of a Japanese/Chinese union against the US despite the fact that China had been fighting China for 10 years. This racist fear was absolutely ridiculous but was a bedrock part of US foreign policy against Japan beginning with conquest of Philippines in 1897. The two volume series the United States Navy in the Pacific 1897-1922 by William Braisted makes this racist basis in American foreign policy quite evident.The adversarial Cold War and current international security environments unfortunately are greatly the result of American inability to understand the Soviets and an irrational ideological fear of communism. The book makes American leadership; with exception of FDR; appear to be motivated by need to protect the elite private American owners of capital as reason for winning the war. On Page 199 Admiral Yarnell discusses the threat of American workers to the national security state. He says there will be "a strong demand to return our men from foreign stations as soon as possible; a decrease of interest in foreign commitments; strikes and labor unrest; ... race riots". American workers had gone through the Great Depression and 4 years of world war but if after this long period of deprivation they ask for their share that demand is seen as a threat to the US and are linked to violence and unrest.Prior to the US turning on the Soviets the US was decidedly anti-British due to their war policies being motivated by imperial concerns. The US went from being determined to deconstruct empires to supporting maintenance of the British and French Empires. Why? Because of the irrational ideological fear of communism. There should be no reason to fear communism if the capitalist system didnt take advantage of workers. Only a form of guilt by the owners of capital because of their treatment of workers would make communism a concern. If that became the will of the majority it would have been US policy to prevent adaption of that system? Time and time again since WWII the US has supported dictators against the will of the people so as to maintain stability. Time and time again it has come back to bite America as we have been on the wrong side.It is shocking to see American leaders emerge from WWII with the only intact economy and sole possession of atomic bombs but yet afraid of the power of the Soviet Union. It makes a person realize the delusional paranoid nature of the American national security establishment. The book notes the introduction of academics into national defense strategy beginning with Navy Secretary Forrestal. The fruit of that today is the devotion of a large amount of academic resources into national security planning. Prior to WWII that planning was a function of the military. There were not hundreds of thousands of people dedicating themselves full time for the planning of war. The book also discusses the takeover of US foreign policy by the military establishment. Prior to Pearl Harbor the military had no input in foreign policy which was probably a mistake when the Philippines is considered. However; beginning with WWII American foreign policy is dominated and set by national security concerns. During the post war planning the State Department virtually had no voice. The State Department under Clinton setting up spy operations in Cuba under the guise of humanitarian operations or trying to collect DNA samples of foreign diplomats is just evidence of this militarization of the State Department itself. The international security environment of today resembles to a great deal the system that Americans established in WWII. This is a must read book to grasp international security environment of today. I don't see this US constructed system lasting much longer though. Should be very interesting times when it is recognized as dysfunctional and violent and is replaced.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Exhaustive Academic StudyBy DFMMark A. Stoler—professor emeritus; University of Vermont—does a superb job outlining the development and implementation of wartime strategies from a multiservice US military perspective. His exhaustive study sheds light on various inter- and intra-service policy disputes; strategic disagreements between military and civilian agencies during both the pre-war and combat phases of the conflict; and US-British/US-Russian military relations. The book heavily focuses on the impact of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the war; highlighting how the emergence of joint military strategic planning significantly—and indefinitely—altered US civ-mil relations. The author’s original contribution to the field is his analysis and description of how the armed forces transformed from an entity largely concerned with “how” to execute policy administered by civilian authorities; to one directly engaged in policy formation. Utilizing an abundance of primary source documents in support of his scholarship; Professor Stoler provides the reader with a solid understanding of the development and execution of military strategy throughout World War II; and its impact on America’s approach to foreign affairs in the post-war era.The author consults numerous US archives; which include the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; George C. Marshall Library; National Archives; and Army/Navy Operational Archives; among a host of special collections at university libraries. Additionally; he references material from the United Kingdom’s Office of Public Record; numerous memoirs; and several secondary sources. For the benefit of the reader; Stoler provides an abundance of direct citations in the text; making it easy to reference the material in support of his scholarship.Prior to the twentieth century; branches of the US military were largely disinterested in policy formation; content to leave global planning to civilian agencies and elected representatives. The State Department and numerous presidents prior to the outbreak of World War I concurred; demonstrating active hostility to the idea of military involvement in strategic decisions. Although there were calls for increased integration and coordination during the aftermath of World War I; these requests fell on deaf ears until 1938 when the fear of Axis activities in the Western Hemisphere began to take hold. Over the next few years; there was a dramatic effort to achieve greater inter-service and civ-mil coordination; ultimately culminating in the creation of the JCS in early 1942.However; the creation of a joint-service advisory board for global strategy did not result in uniformity of opinion among branches. Stoler repeatedly highlights service disagreements throughout the book; tracing branch ideology to the nation’s founding. Concerned with the threat of militarism; early congressional representatives sought to keep the army under scrutiny; excluding them from policy discussions. As a result; soldiers from the late eighteenth century until the 1930s were overwhelmingly pacifistic and isolationist. During the interwar period; the army largely sought to secure continental and hemispheric security; advocating against military intervention outside of this realm. Meanwhile; the navy considered this approach far too limited; resulting in numerous inter-service disagreements. Although German advancement and the creation of the JCS resulted in a degree of unity—such as the initial decision to focus on hemispheric security—each service’s unique history influenced how they viewed the war; and led to divergent policy prescriptions when it came to military strategy and alliance formation.In addition to inter-service disputes; the JCS also advocated for policies not widely embraced or accepted by the State Department or White House. For example; the military strongly disagreed with FDR’s decision to extend Lend-Lease aid to Russia and repeatedly expressed concern with potential British manipulation of its forces and strategy. Tensions were especially high between the JCS and civilian secretaries of state; war; and navy; who were ultimately forced to relinquish power and influence as a result of the body’s creation.Two contentious issues highlighted in the book concerned US alliances with Britain and Russia. Emphasized by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and Joint War Plans Committee; many within the service were wary of the British; whom they perceived as primarily interested in exploiting US personnel and resources to maintain Imperial power. Both committees believed that a basic British goal was the expansion; rather than the restoration of; their pre-war empire. Anti-British sentiments were widespread and rooted in commercial economic antagonisms and a perception that the empire had manipulated US forces for its own end during World War I. The services were also concerned with FDR’s growing relationship with Stalin; and initially advocated against providing aid to the Soviet Union out of a growing uncertainty “as to where Russian successes might lead” (p. 133). Stoler describes these civ-mil disagreements in significant detail throughout the book.In sum; Stoler has done a fantastic job outlining the development and implementation of wartime strategy in this exhaustive and detailed academic study. Although likely to appeal to historians and students of the period; this extensive book is particularly dense and therefore may not be an attractive option for the casual reader.