In 1947 German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring was tried and convicted of war crimes committed during World War II. He was held responsible for his troops having executed nearly 9;000 Italian citizens—women; children; elderly men—in retaliation for partisan attacks. His conviction; however; created a real dilemma for the United States and western Europe. While some sought the harshest punishments available for anyone who had participated in the war crimes of the Nazi regime; others believed that the repatriation of alleged war criminals would help secure the allegiance of a rearmed West Germany in the dangerous new Cold War against the Soviet Union.Kerstin von Lingen's close analysis of the Kesselring case reveals for the first time how a network of veterans; lawyers; and German sympathizers in Britain and America achieved the commutation of Kesselring's death sentence and his eventual release—reinforcing German popular conceptions that he had been innocent all along and that the Wehrmacht had fought a "clean war" in Italy. Synthesizing the work of contemporary German and Italian historians with her own exhaustive archival research; she shows that Kesselring bore much greater guilt for civilian deaths than had been proven in court—and that the war on the southern front had been far from clean.Von Lingen weaves together strands of the story as diverse as Winston Churchill's ability to mobilize support among British elites; Basil Liddell Hart's need to be recognized as an important military thinker; and the Cold War fears of the "Senators' Circle" in the United States. Through this rich narrative; she shows how international politics shaped the trial's proceedings and outcome—as well as the memory and meaning of the war for German citizens—and sheds new light on the complex interplay between the combatants' efforts to "master the past" and the threatening state of international relations in the early Cold War.In analyzing the efforts to clear Kesselring's name; von Lingen shows that the case was about much more than the fate of one convicted individual; it also underscored the pressure to wrap up the war crimes issue—and German guilt—in order to get on with the business of bringing a rearmed Germany into the Western alliance. Kesselring's Last Battle sheds new light on the "politics of memory" by unraveling a twisted thread in postwar history as it shows how historical truth is sometimes sacrificed on the altar of expediency.
#1540315 in Books University Press of Kansas 1993-04-15Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.02 x .51 x 5.98l; .77 #File Name: 0700611037222 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Very interesting view of the theories and application of air ...By CustomerVery interesting view of the theories and application of air power in World War 2.Brief read; but informative.A little light on Pacific theater conflict; but that is mostly because the book focuses more on the Army and Air Force than the Navy.7 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Review of Bombs; Cities; CiviliansBy Charles G. KjosThis is not an action-packed blow-by-blow account of battles; it's about U.S. WW II bombing strategy -- the most analytical; insightful; source material based book I've read in my admittedly limited WW II reading. The author is a real scholar -- I'll be passing this book to friends and reading other books by the author.11 of 12 people found the following review helpful. an informative account of the air warBy 1.According to Crane; Allied air commanders in Europe prioritized accuracy while General LeMay valued the psychological aspects of delibrately targeting civilians. American commanders such as Spaatz advocated precision bombing even if it meant greater causalties. Crane writes that civilian causalties became more acceptable when the Army Airforce began bombing transpotation targets in Europe and thereby incuring greater civilian causalties. Plus both Fifteenth and Eighth airforces began using radar directed bombing practices that were less accurate. General LeMay completely ignored the accuracy doctrine and started to delibrately bomb civilian areas. The aim of LeMay's stragedy was to shock the Japanese to surrender. Crane concludes his book by writing about the mediocre record of strategic bombing since the Second World War. Bombing was ineffective against preindustrilized countries such as North Korea and Vietnam; but was effective in shocking Iraq ground soldiers to surrender in the Gulf War. The only weakness of this book is that Crane ignored close air support doctrine within the airforce. But if one wants to study about the American bombing campaigns this is a highly informative study.
