A continuation of the remarkable documentary history of the early Republic Maureen Taylor; the nation’s foremost historical photo detective; continues her quest to document the Revolutionary War generation with this collection of rare nineteenth-century photographic images. Primarily comprised of daguerreotypes; ambrotypes; and carte de visite paper photographs; this collection of nearly sixty images presents new works of photography and art. It assigns faces to a previously un-illustrated war and tells the stories of our nation’s Founding Fathers and Mothers; updating and supplementing research published over a century ago. Taylor explains how she collected the images for this project and describes the exhaustive research involved in dating and identifying each image. She also explains the process she used for investigating the story and genealogy of each subject. The array of images is expansive and includes veterans; loyalists; Native Americans; African Americans; children; and women. Although the faces are old and wizened; the stories they tell are of youthful bravery in the early days of the Republic. The Last Muster; Volume 2 continues the author’s contribution to the history of the American Revolution; the early Republic; and photography. Through these portraits and the accompanying narrative; readers have the opportunity to relive the Revolutionary War.
#1611005 in Books Texas AnM University Press 2008-09-01Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.40 x 1.10 x 6.20l; .0 #File Name: 1603440526304 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy Customerrequired for school class13 of 13 people found the following review helpful. Excellent Account of the Political; Intrigues and Command Failures in Longstreet's Little Known East Tennessee CampaignBy Daniel HurleyWhat is fascinating about Mendoza's book; in my view; is his writings and excellent research for the period after the battle of Chickamauga. Most of the history relating to Chickamauga is well known and Mendoza covers that period quickly on the First Corps' history and the initial transfer to the west. The most interesting parts of the book starts with the much covered telling of the Army of the Tennessee's general staff attempt to rid themselves of Braxton Bragg with President Davis' odd; embarrassing and damaging attempt to stymie Bragg's removal by sustaining Bragg; leading to the fracture of the army's command structure and morale. The book contains relatively even critiques of Longstreet but highlights what appears to be gross errors in retrospect; the worst being the promotion of senior officer Jenkins over Law that causes bitterness within Hood's division that Law never gets over and later seems to include Robertson; also in Hood's division. The loss of Lookout Valley was a major loss in Longstreet's sector contributed to by the conflict between Jenkins and Law but the author's critique of Longstreet I think is a little harsh. The union movement; floating men down the Tennessee on pontoon rafts around Moccasin Point in the middle of the night was quite a feat; allowing a bridgehead and a prompt shuttling of force. I have been to the site and find it incredulous that this movement was undetected by confederate pickets; but recognition has to be given to the Union's audacity and brilliant success. Mendoza shines with his description and documentation of Longstreet's movement to Knoxville ordered by Bragg as Bragg apparently divorces himself from Longstreet. The movement to Knoxville; appreciated by Grant who encourages Burnside to lightly engage and fall back to Knoxville; is difficult due to limited transportation for the First Corps; questionable reinforcements and the intrigues of Bragg who writes very negative letters to Richmond about Longstreet's movements and cooperation; which are not completely accurate. The other command issue that comes to head is Longstreet's brewing conflict with old friend Lafayette McLaws; who held a low opinion of Longstreet since Gettysburg as noted in his infamous letter "Longstreet is a great big humbug" often quoted by historian Robert Krick. And; as the author points out; Longstreet appears unaware of this earlier separation of support until it manifests itself in the campaign. What Mendoza brings out that I also found very fascinating is the level of intrigue that Bragg was involved in while in his position as Davis' military advisor. Bragg; under the radar; coaches Longstreet's disenfranchised generals to Longstreet's detriment and certainly is not acting as an appropriate military advisor encouraging Longstreet's command problems and eroding his already weak political support. In addition; Davis' constant interfering with the First Corps command is quite damaging and evident of his micromanagement; not allowing Longstreet a freer hand in removing officers or selecting replacements. A case in point; Longstreet prefers to transfer his old friend McLaws out of the First Corps just as Bragg had several officers transferred but Mendoza points out Davis and Cooper disallow Longstreet the same option; forcing him to prefer charges against his old friend. If the command difficulties and lack of political support were not enough; the low point is the desperate attack on Fort Sanders; certainly not the best decision by Longstreet. However; Longstreet was sent to Knoxville to dislodge Burnside; who performed well during his mission to keep Longstreet entertained; and with the presence of Bragg's engineering officer; the need to try something may have been overwhelming. The problems within the Army of Tennessee that spreads to the First Corps reminds me of the early period of the Army of the Potomac (see historian Stephen Sears). Repeated failures appear to cause contempt in any organization.Even if you have read Thomas Connelly's great 2 volume study of the Army of Tennessee; his "The Politics of Command" and Piston's "Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant; you will find Mendoza's study of Longstreet's east Tennessee campaign fascinating and Bragg's ability to continue vendetta's in a position of high responsibility fascinating. As trying as it was for Longstreet to rid himself of unsupportive staff; Mendoza makes a great point in his conclusion; what would Stonewall Jackson have done if a corps commander and a division commander stopped an attack to wait for their supply trains? As I recall reading about the battle of Kernstown; Stonewall tried to court martial General Richard Garrett for retiring from the field after running out of ammunition ("Why not give them the bayonet?").5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Softer Use of Critical Opinions of LongstreetBy J. The RebelThis book has a good focus in its covering of Longstreet's transfer to the western theater; and his contribution to the Confederate effort there. It covers the period with a moderate level of detail; without boring me with minutia. The strengths are plenty of research; good explainations; and an style of writing that kept my attention. Another positive aspect is Mendoza does not lecture like some of the Lost Cause influenced writers concerning Longstreet; such as Cozzens or Hallock; but he still stays on the path of what Lost Cause thinking of Longstreet seems to demand in the world of Civil War academia. The weakness in this book is a reiteration of what many earlier authors have said; chiefly criticizing Longstreet for how he dealt with Braxton Bragg.It hurts the credibility of a book when a writer oversteps his or her practical knowledge. Mendoza does this in a few spots in this book. One instance; which I totally disagree with; is at Chickamauga he states that Longstreet made a blunder by missing an opportunity to go through a gap. He calls it a blunder; and then says in the same paragraph it is understandable based upon the densely wooded terrain. So really it was not a blunder because no one could see a gap in the woods? As a reader I wondered where he came up with this unfounded criticism. Looking at the notes one sees they are all secondary source opinions of earlier authors.At Chattanooga Mendoza also thinks that Longstreet was supposed to have prevented the Union forces from coming into Lookout Valley; and stop the Union from setting up a supply line through there. Bragg was the army commander; so that was his job to make a decision about what to do about the "Cracker Line." Not Longstreet's. Again; Mendoza followed what earlier secondary sources claim.The Knoxville portion is better. In this chapter Mendoza is a little less judgmental; or he does not throw unclear judgments on the table as a fact. He highlights that Longstreet was really having a tough time with several problems that came all at the same time. This was his worst campaign; but it came so close at few instances to achieving victory over Burnside; and for that Mendoza credits Longstreet objectively. Longstreet was going through a period of low confidence; according to Mendoza; and criticizes Longstreet for letting too much time go by before attacking Knoxville. This he bases upon on the testimony of one of his officers; Porter Alexander. In this case the criticism is correct and credible; since it was a true observation from an officer on the scene; rather than the opinion of someone who did not participate in the war; or simply has no basis to judge.Confederate Struggle for Command is a more nuanced upgrade of some of the previous criticisms of Longstreet in the west. It had the potential to be more original; but it's clear to me Mendoza mostly seemed to lean toward what has already been said by the anti-Longstreet community. Overall it deserves 3.9 stars.
