For much of the twentieth century; Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials recognized that the US-Mexico border region was different. Here; they confronted a set of political; social; and environmental obstacles that prevented them from replicating their achievements on Angel Island and Ellis Island; the most restrictive immigration stations in the nation. In response to these challenges; local INS officials resorted to the law; nullifying; modifying; and creating the nation's immigration laws and policies for the borderlands. In The INS on the Line; S. Deborah Kang traces the ways in which the INS on the US-Mexico border made and remade the nation's immigration laws over the course of the twentieth century. Through a nuanced examination of the agency's legal innovations in the Southwest; Kang demonstrates that the agency defined itself not only as a law enforcement unit but also as a lawmaking body. In this role; the INS responded to the interests of local residents; businesses; politicians; and social organizations on both sides of the US-Mexico border as well as policymakers in Washington; DC. Given the sheer variety of local and federal demands; local immigration officials constructed a complex approach to border control; an approach that closed the line in the name of nativism and national security; opened it for the benefit of transnational economic and social concerns; and redefined it as a vast legal jurisdiction for the policing of undocumented immigrants. The composite approach to border control developed by the INS continues to inform the daily operations of the nation's immigration agencies; American immigration law and policy; and conceptions of the US-Mexico border today.
#124424 in Books David Kilcullen 2010-05-19Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 5.50 x .80 x 8.20l; .68 #File Name: 0199737495272 pagesCounterinsurgency
Review
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Good Text BookBy Thomas M. MageeOver the past ten years our television screens have been filled with images of Afghanistan and Iraq. This oonflict has been described as an insurgency. Various Generals have described the US response to this as a counterinsurgency. I am sure many people wonder what that is. This book answers that very question. It describes how to run a counterinsurgency.For sure military people need to read this book. The book will arm you with priceless information which might save your life. Others might like the book as a tool to understand what is going on.The book in reality is a collection of articles by the author; David Kilcullen. The author served as an advisor to General Petrais during the surge in Iraq. He is also a retired LTC with the Australian Army. These articles offer gems of wisdom that will unlock the gates of knowledge about the subject. There is also a few lessons nonmilitary people will like his chapter on indicators. He talks about how you measure success on large projects as counterinsurgency. I also liked the last chapter about the grand world wide islamic counterinsurgency as he put it. The tactics he suggests gives hope to all of us as you watch the TV events.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Excellent bookBy J. WickAnother excellent book from this author. Must-read on this topic.23 of 25 people found the following review helpful. Underdeveloped but ultimately worthwhileBy Duane McMullenFor students and practitioners of statecraft; nation building; counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism; David Kilcullen is a living legend.His main claim to fame is as author of the modern classic 'Twenty-Eight Articles'; the writing of which apparently started on a whim in a Washington area Starbucks early one March 2006 evening and finished on his laptop at home the wee hours of the following morning. Emailed to a few colleagues for comment that early morning; the article went viral (even I received a copy!) and has now been read in its hundreds of thousands of copies; perhaps millions; translated into multiple languages and a freely available download if one but types its name into an internet search.An experienced army officer and academic; so steeped in counterinsurgency to have written such a masterwork of community-level operations as 'Twenty-Eight Articles'; must have more to say if given book-length scope to say it. 'Counterinsurgency' is David Kilcullen's second book-length opportunity to do so. I was disappointed to discover that it is not really a book but a loosely connected patchwork of his previously published articles; including a repeat of 'Twenty-Eight Articles'; each with a patina of his annotations.An initial point; tantalizingly dangled and then abruptly left hanging; is that the only two hard rules of counter-insurgency are (1) an absolute need to respect non-combatants and (2) to beware of template approaches; given that successful counterinsurgencies are ultimately custom built to fit a particular situation and may involve doing precisely the opposite of a solution that worked in a different insurgency.The patchwork of articles approach frustrated me as it only partially illustrated any conclusions; and even that was too frequently left to the reader's own inferences. Beyond the author being a key participant and that it allowed the reprinting of a previously published article; I ended confused; for example; as to the logic behind including a 40 page discussion (about 20% of the book) on a minor 1999 engagement during East Timor's separation from Indonesia. If there were broad conclusions that could be drawn from that engagement - the Australian Army; in this instance; was arguably an ultimately successful UN-sponsored insurgent force against the counterinsurgent Indonesian Army - the conclusions should have been spelled out. I was too thick to detect them.Even the title; 'Counterinsurgency'; seems to bait and switch diplomats; aid workers and soldiers hungry for knowledge in advance of a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. One of the points the author seems guide the reader toward is that if the issue is seen as a counterinsurgency; rather than a competition between systems within which an insurgency operates; the effort may be doomed to defeat itself.Notwithstanding the lack of organizing frame and direction; the book contained much of value. The brief; stark and sober chapter on measuring performance in Afghanistan was itself worth the price of the book. Likewise; the final chapter contained promising ideas; vexingly only partially developed; about insurgencies as systems best dealt with on a systems level. That concept; more fully elaborated; may have been the great book I was hoping for.Perhaps my expectations were raised too high by the elegance and blinding clarity of 'Twenty-Eight Articles'; but 'Counterinsurgency' ultimately disappoints as a stock and workmanlike addition to the genre; interrupted by brief flashes of blinding insight.
