Immense in scope; ferocious in nature; and epic in consequence; the Battle of Kursk witnessed (at Prokhorovka) one of the largest tank engagements in world history and led to staggering losses—including nearly 200;000 Soviet and 50;000 German casualties—within the first ten days of fighting. Going well beyond all previous accounts; David Glantz and Jonathan House now offer the definitive work on arguably the greatest battle of World War II.Drawing on both German and Soviet sources; Glantz and House separate myth from fact to show what really happened at Kursk and how it affected the outcome of the war. Their access to newly released Soviet archival material adds unprecedented detail to what is known about this legendary conflict; enabling them to reconstruct events from both perspectives and describe combat down to the tactical level.The Battle of Kursk takes readers behind Soviet lines for the first time to discover what the Red Army knew about the plans for Hitler's offensive (Operation Citadel); relive tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat; and learn how the tide of battle turned. Its vivid portrayals of fighting in all critical sectors place the famous tank battle in its proper context. Prokhorovka here is not a well-organized set piece but a confused series of engagements and hasty attacks; with each side committing its forces piecemeal.Glantz and House's fresh interpretations demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently. Their account is the first to provide accurate figures of combat strengths and losses; and it includes 32 maps that clarify troop and tank movements.Shrouded in obscurity and speculation for more than half a century; the Battle of Kursk finally gets its due in this dramatic retelling of the confrontation that marked the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front and brought Hitler's blitzkrieg to a crashing halt.
#1532933 in Books University Press of Kansas 1995-11-30Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.30 x 1.45 x 6.29l; 1.82 #File Name: 0700607188424 pagesCivil WarHistoryConfederacyCampaigns Battlefields
Review
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful. Some hits; some missesBy Thomas W. RobinsonWoodworth; who previously looked at Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his generals in the Western Theater; turns his attention to Davis and his Eastern generals. The title is a bit misleading as while the bulk of the book does center on Davis and Robert E. Lee; the first 150 pages or so deal more with Davis' relationships with Joseph E. Johnson and P.G.T. Beauregard. In the end; Woodworth has crafted a highly readable book that is equally interesting and infuriating. The book is interesting because Woodworth has some new interpretations and posits a clear thesis--namely; Davis and Lee got along mainly because Lee kept Davis "in the loop." This seems a tad bit simple; but sometimes simple answers are the right ones. In this case; one comes away believing that Woodworth has proved his thesis; but also feeling that the author has cherry-picked some of his evidence and came into the work with extreme biases.Fortunately for Woodworth; the main strength of the book is the discussion and description of the working partnership of Lee and Davis. While in hindsight it might appear that the two could obviously get along if for nothing else than Lee's military prowess; Woodworth does well to remind readers that in the first year or so of the war; Lee was actually not a very popular figure in the South. In fact; many Richmond newspapers mocked and ridiculed him; labeling him "Granny Lee" for a disastrous campaign he oversaw in what is now West Virginia. However; Woodworth shows that Davis never lost faith in Lee and when Johnston was wounded; Lee was immediately given command of what would become the Army of Northern Virginia. From there; the book picks up considerable steam. Woodworth argues that Davis did not agree with Lee's proposed offensive tactics; but deferred to his trusted general from the outset. Woodworth argues that this is due in large part to the fact that Lee was willing to share his plans with Davis; ask for Davis' counsel; and treat Davis with respect. This was in direct contrast to Johnston and Beauregard; who both often kept Davis in the dark as to their plans; felt Davis was stepping on their toes; and often treated Davis with contempt. According to Woodworth; what ended up happening is Davis took his respect for Lee's intellect and appreciation of Lee's personality and turned that into unbridled confidence in his generalship. Due to this; Davis set aside his own strategy (more defensive) in favor of Lee's bold tactics.With regard to his analysis of Davis and Lee's relationship; there is not a lot to quarrel with Woodworth over. He seems to treat Lee as somewhat infallible; but he is not the first; or last; Civil War historian to do that. It does seem; however; that Woodworth is a big fan of both Davis and Lee and this brings up the most serious criticism of the book. It is obvious from reading this book that Woodworth has some severe biases at work. All historians and writers in general for that matter; have biases. However; most of them do a good job of hiding them. Woodworth; on the other hand; smacks you over the head with them. This would not be a problem except it leads him to stretch his evidence. Woodworth obviously dislikes both Johnston and Beauregard and this leads to issues in the book. First and foremost; Woodworth paints Johnston as some sort of archvillian. While Woodworth does a good job of pointing out Johnston's faults; he leaves Davis to look as if he played no role in the two's animosity toward each other. The even bigger issue; though; is that Woodworth misses the obvious point that Johnston and Davis agreed on strategy. Despite this; Woodworth argues Davis would have been better off ditching Johnston at the beginning of the war because Johnston lacked the moral courage to fight. While Johnston was notorious for his retreats and slow movements; this seems like a stretch on Woodworth's part. To me; the Davis-Johnston relationship does as much to show Davis' faults as it does Johnston's. Davis was unwilling to work with Johnston; despite their agreement on strategy; simply due to the fact that he did not like him. The other problem in the beginning of the book is that Woodworth jumps back and forth playing the blame game. When Johnston and Davis briefly were getting along after First Manassas; Beauregard is painted as the bad guy. When Beauregard and Davis are getting along; suddenly Johnston is the bad egg. Finally; Woodworth also has a disdain for James Longstreet; who he introduces as basically stupid; which borders on irrationality. Whatever your personal take is on Longstreet; to introduce him as stupid just seems a bit much. Taken individually these are not real problems; but considering Woodworth does this throughout much of the book; his injection of his biases really drags the book down.Woodworth is not uncritical of Davis; but this book; when put side-by-side with his previous work; seems somewhat out of place. While his previous work essentially blamed Davis for losing the war in the West due to his personal character flaws; this work states that Davis had the right strategy and rose above some of his petty personal flaws once Lee took command. Instead; it is more obvious; thanks to Woodworth's work; that Davis did not rise above anything. Lee was willing to tell Davis what he wanted to hear and not clash with the President. Thus; the two got along swimmingly despite having differing strategic ideas. All the while; Davis still clashed with other military and political leaders because of the very personality flaws Woodworth claims he rose above with Lee. It leaves one feeling as if you got half the story; but Woodworth covered up some of the rest so as to paint Davis and Lee in a better light.Still; Woodworth deserves credit for this venture. It gives an excellent look at the Confederate President and his dealings with his generals in the Eastern Theater. It is chock full of detail and contains many primary sources. That being said; the flaws of the book mean it is surely not the last word on this subject and could be improved upon. Still; it is an excellent place to start and gives an interesting comparison to Davis and his generals and Abraham Lincoln and his.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Four StarsBy CustomerMet all expectations12 of 13 people found the following review helpful. One of the best books on war time leadershipBy Aussie ReaderI found this book to be one of the best books about command decisions and relationships between Politicians and generals during the Civil War I have ever read. It covers the battles and the leaders of the Confederacy; both great and flawed. I found it hard to believe that some Southern leaders/generals fought harder against their own side in stupid little infights and disputes. The book goes a long way in explaining Lee's strategy and that of Davis and how they were different and the results of that difference. This book concentrates on the Eastern Theatre; the author's other book 'Jefferson Davis and his Generals' covers the Western Theatre of operations and is brillant in its examination of this area. Both books are well worth reading.
