PDF Endgame at Stalingrad: Book Two: December 1942–-February 1943 (Modern War Studies: The Stalingrad; Vol. 3) by David M. Glantz; Jonathan M. House in History

Review

8 of 8 people found the following review helpful. Not the definitive story of Stalingrad battleBy F. Carol SabinA complex historical event such as Stalingrad battle requires extensive and complex books; painstaking research and analysis from many sources and archival documents. This can be done objectively and thoroughly by experienced authors who can understand the story from ALL perspectives; especially when in the battle were involved more than two opposing parties. This can be viewed as a (moral) responsibility for all authors who attempt to write a superlative book or a “definitive account” of a battle/operation.Never before has a work on this subject been presented so thoroughly from the Eastern front’s expert point of view and its high level would not be reached in the near future. As far as the content goes this tome is NEARLY the definitive thing.There are at least three welcomed threads of information stemming from Endgame at Stalingrad (book 1).The first one is also the most important since it eliminated the historical misconceptions and myths of wildly routing Romanian forces maintained by many authors and nearly every book that described this battle for over 70 years. The authors substantially demonstrated that the vast majority of the Romanian forces held their ground and defended the best they could do; fought against overwhelming odds; had not broken en masse or fled as many authors suggest in some books. Resistance of many units collapsed; due to lack of modern heavy antitank guns; but it was not the retreat en masse! After first day (not mentioned in the book!); there were only two breakthroughs: one in 89th Inf. Regiment sector/ROU 13 Inf. Div. (10-12 km wide and 35 km depth in Kletskaya sector) and one in 13th Inf. Regiment/ROU 14 Inf. Div. (15-18 km wide and 15 km depth in Blinov sector). So; two regiments out of 24 ROU regiments!The shoulders of both penetrations were firmly held until 22-23 Nov. 1942; allowing a successful counterattack; if mounted by 48 Pz. Corps. The disaster was amplified by Soviet tanks in the rear areas since there were no credible reserves to stop them. In the Rzhev area; Soviets tanks (MG Solomatin’s 1st Mech. Corps) penetrated German lines (352 Grenadier Reg./246 Inf Div.-15-20 km wide and 30-40 km depth); but their advance was stopped by German powerful panzer reserves (1; 12; 19; 20 Panzer Divs.).Many previous authors didn’t take into account that when German forces encountered fleeing Romanians soldiers (including here “eagle-eye” H. Rudel); they were seeing many times administrative; logistics or rear area units with minimum training; but also remnants of some front line units. Antonescu spoke many times about German units fleeing and gathered in Morozovsk.The supposedly weak Romanian forces gave actually a far stiffer fight than originally assumed by the Soviet planners. However; to be honest; Marschal Antonescu; in one letter addressed to Manstein; spoke about isolated cases of “lack of resistance”. As authors stated in their book; the Romanians and other allies could perform much better if provided with new equipment from Germany. It was always promised; but remained only on the paper; few arrived and too late (for example; Romanian armies needed 300.000 mines and received 50.000).In my opinion; the most important reasons for the Romanian defeat were: huge frontages (3 ROU Army; 1.5 miles per battalion and 8 miles! per battalion in the 4 ROU Army); very weak AT defense (37/47 mm AT guns and one 75 mm AT battery per division); insufficient panzer reserves (“green” ROU 1 Panzer and incomplete German 22 Panzer divisions able to seal only one penetration on one direction!) and poor supply and logistics (under German command) and lastly; Soviet overwhelmed superiority in all capabilities (personnel; tanks; guns; aircraft); now revealed maybe for the first time at its true extent in valuable tables and ending a persistent controversy and mythology (largely sustained by Soviets!) that the opposing forces were almost equal.Second; this book offers unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives about the genesis of Plan Uranus; competing offensive concepts and the triumph of the “different solution”- broader encirclement of the Sixth Army.Concerning the date/period of Uranus planning; rejecting the overestimate Soviet wisdom; one question still bother me for a long time; even prior to this book: How could the Soviets plan an operation; almost two months before its start; knowing that: 1) the Stalingrad will not fall soon; even in September or October 1942 it was very close to collapse 2) the flanks of the Sixth Army will be defended by Axis allies; thus allowing the “different solution” and 3) these forces have no adequate AT guns and no proper operational tank reserves? Is there something missing from the puzzle? Please note that there were no fewer than eight attempts (offensives) orchestrated by the Red Army to defeat or slow the Axis advance in South Russia; with no relevant gains.Third; this study mention Soviet achievements (four “firsts” on pages 378-379) during this operation (surrounding an entire Axis army; the ability to penetrate Axis tactical defenses; the defeat of the (weak) operational reserves in the operational depth and logistical feats); but also the outright disappointments (among other things; it took five days and not three to complete the encirclement).Fourth; it provided additional information about the successes of the Axis operational reserves in disrupting offensive’s timetable; when properly employed. As Leyser’s 29 Mot. Inf. Div. successful counterattack in South or the mobile defence of the weak 48 Pz. Corps in North demonstrated that the presence of stronger mobile reserves; as in Rzhev area; could thwart any Uranus-style operation.Fifth; as authors showed the sharp and carefully Soviet planning of Uranus Operation didn’t go as smoothly as planned; like a clockwork training exercise; and it took more days to fulfill the mission than anticipated; due to determined defence of the most German and Romanian units.Eventually; the authors claimed that the Germans were caught unprepared to deal the Uranus offensive. The deployment of the 22 Pz Div.; the planned deployment from France of the 6 Pz Div.; constant Romanian intel reports; additional archival documents in which Antonescu said clearly “we were forewarned about the imminent Bolshevik offensive” are enough examples of measures taken in order to prevent the incoming onslaught. Actually; they had very few measures available to counter any possible offensive.Surely one can read between the lines and see the seeds of my concern and disappointment.With the opening of long-sealed Soviet and other communist countries archives beginning in the 1990s; English-speaking readers have begun to better comprehend the enormity and decisive nature of the fighting between Germany and her Axis allies and the Soviet Union. Despite the huge scale of the fighting and the interest to reveal the truth; much of its history remains hidden (see forgotten battles) and imperfectly understood. This “trilogy” is one of the first sets of its kind to present a history of the Eastern Front that includes up-to-date information culled from long-sealed archives by some of the foremost military historians of the Eastern Front.Like the authors' first two books; this one has also significant archival material from Russian sources. This material is still far from exhausting all that's available in Russian; but it does provide original and new information and the necessary context. This is good thing. Not as good is the apparent depth of research into Romanian archival documents. If you look at the notes in any of the first two books; but also in other books (Slaughterhouse; Red Storm over Balkans; etc); you'll find that most accounts about Romanian forces are sourced to Axworthy et Co; Third Axis; Fourth Ally; proclaimed on page 163 to be; somehow accurately; but still an irksome explanation for such high-caliber historians; “the standard English-language source on Romanian forces in the war”. Don't get me wrong; the authors can use whatever sources they believe are relevant and that study is good enough. But; the bottom line for me is that I was expecting more insight research into archivesbooks for the reason of the importance of the Romanian Army participation in Operation Uranus and follow-on battles.I'm not sure that I emphasize enough the necessity of revealing the whole story from all perspectives and that’s one of my chief reasons why I'm not giving the book five stars. A good book; claimed to be the definitive story of the Battle of Stalingrad; cannot be written without full Romanian perspective of these events. They missed along the way; important aspects such as accurate number of troops surrounded (actually; there were 12.607 Romanians not 20.000; and only 2-3.000 survived the siege); losses (between 19.11.1942-07.01.1943 Romania lost over 158.000 troops or 16 out of 18 divisions; 50% of all armed forces; compare this with Germany losses - 10% of their all armed forces); countless events; ROU air force attacks; equipment; actions; counterattacks or command relationship between Romanian-German HQs - not always friendly; to mention just a few.Let’s force an example Dr. Glantz and Dr. House: How would look the “definitive book” of the Battle of the Bulge only from German and English; Belgian and French villagers’ perspectives?I saw many times reviewers that complained about the GlantzHouse style; often tedious; dull or the abundance of the information. Serious students don’t really bother about these aspects and I don’t blame the authors; since I knew their style for years and I can skip some parts; if necessary. However; there is one positive side of this “abundance of information”: no doubt; GlantzHouse hit where everybody failed; that is; the Soviet archives. Their access was impressive and they deserve the credit for providing; with whatever cost (it must be a cost/swap when dealing with Soviets!); huge amounts of interesting information. They dig and dived into Russian archives more than anyone else and; I guess; took everything they could digest. I see no other (Western) researcher in the near future with such access; except probably; the Russian historians that are not departing too much from official versions. So; thanks to their dedication; now; the readers and future historians can analyze and select; from their abundant material; the most important parts and expands their achievements.The chronological presentation of the events and actions on both flanks is also the best format to show the operation; even Romanian books/archives use this format; perfectly fit for this situation.I paid a special attention to the failed companion piece to operation Uranus; code-named Mars (pages 79-81). The authors made a sound connection between these events; providing enough elements to judge why one succeeded and the other one failed. But I saw no phrase about the influence of the Allied landings in North Africa (November 8; Operation Torch) or the military occupation of the Vichy France (November 1942; operation Anton). Both were mentioned in Romanian archives as having an important influence on OKW decisions making and added pressure on the possible use of some of the best German tank reserves. The earlier deployment on Eastern Front of the 6 (arrived on 24 November!) and 7 Panzer divisions; not to mention; the three SS Panzergrenadier divisions; might have changed the history!The book has 43 maps – not all ok; a bit more time spent on polishing and editing them would have helped immensely. Graphically; the book is a mixed bag. There are some poor; small or simple maps; but also never-seen-before plans or maps. Fortunately; with few exceptions; Romanian archives have the maps and plans of this battle; even the military colored maps dedicated to the battle; so I cannot complain too much. A minor effort to use only the necessary maps would have also avoided some of the reviewers’ observations.Concerning the photos; I must say they are depicting; virtually; all Soviet commanders involved in the operations plus their troops in action; unfortunately; Soviet chiefs of bakery stations and laundry of the three fronts are missing from this selection! No Romanian commanders or troops are shown and just few German generals are presented.The extensive text is complemented by large notes section (56 pages); selected bibliography (German Sixth Army’s Rediscovered Daily Records included) and the usual index.No doubt; this tome is a solid piece of work (it took me five weeks to receive it from UK sibling of ); as the whole “trilogy” and it will stand as a landmark in the Eastern front literature and; in many respects; a model for future researchers. However; for many reasons that could be easily avoided; it will not be the definitive book about Stalingrad.I recommend this book with a 4/5 star rating based on my aforementioned comments and some faults.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Dry reading but nevertheless excellent!By KobaThe end of Glantz's Stalingrad trilogy is two books. Thus; the entire "trilogy" is five books; since there is also a companion volume of documents.The first volume covers November 1942 - the period in which the Soviets encircled the Sixth Army. The second volume covers December through February - the period in which the Soviets defeated the German relief efforts and destroyed Sixth Army.Other reviewers have summarized them well; so there is no need for me to summarize. Suffice it to say that these books contain very few first person "I was there" type accounts; so if you are looking for what it was like to be there; this is not the series for you. (You should try Anthony Beevor's book on Stalingrad or William Craig's Enemy at the Gates for that.)Glantz's books are filled with operational details (i.e.; "this unit went here on this day") supplemented with a good deal of analysis. They are highly detailed and there is a great deal of information I'd never seen before. The most interesting material for me concerned the German plans for a breakout. Glantz shows that Paulus made serious plans and preparations to escape; though ultimately he did not implement them. Glantz also shows that Sixth Army was very weak even in December; and thus a breakout attempt would have been a desperate venture indeed. I was surprised to learn that the vast majority of the German troops in the pocket were "useless mouths" - administrative and support troops who lent very little strength to the fighting effort.The major downside is the same fault that many Glantz books have - namely; the maps are so bad they're almost useless.These two volumes are a must-have for anyone interested in the Eastern Front or Soviet Military History.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. I enjoyed reading this volume as well as the entire seriesBy Mr. T.Glantz is the expert on the Red Army and has written numerous books on war on the Eastern Front. This is book one of volume three; an additional book completes the series for a total of 5 books that completely cover the Battle of Stalingrad. It is quite obvious the book is well researched and contains copious footnotes. The author; in footnotes as well in the companion volume; presents information so the reader can make up their mind; why did the Germans lose so badly at Stalingrad? I enjoyed reading this volume as well as the entire series. The only issue I have with the book; as well as the entire series; it sometimes can be hard to follow because of the way the author presents the actions. I own the entire series; so I consider this to be a minor issue. For the serious WW II student and especially for a student of the Battle of Stalingrad; the entire series are a must have.