PDF From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front; Summer 1944 Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations; Volume 2 (Modern War Studies (Hardcover)) by Charles J. Dick in History

Review

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy TriggerMust for any militiary inteligencia!11 of 11 people found the following review helpful. Incisive Look at Soviet War Doctrine during WWII.By Dave SchranckI enjoyed this concise look at the war in the east. The author strongly believes the primary reason; though not the only reason; why the Soviets came back from a disastrous start to win the war was the development and implementation of an improved operational art doctrine.The book begins a decade or two before the war and provides the reader a brief history of the Soviet development of this operational art; showing the improvements made by Tukhachevskiy and his peers to military doctrine. This introduction also shows the disastrous setbacks caused by Stalin’s purges and that by 1941 the military leadership had been dismantled and unprepared to defend the country against a massive attack. The introduction continues with the highlights of the first year or so of the war; showing the German victories and due to poor doctrine the descent of the Soviet Army into near collapse. The 1942-43 period was a transition period where Stavka improved their strategy and qualified generals like Zhukov; Konev and others proved their abilities and were given greater authority in the field. By 1944 all the ingredients of winning the war were in place: Doctrine; Reorganization; Commanders; Men and Materiale. This introduction is important for it lays the foundation for the rest of the book.The rest of the book fleshes out the description of this doctrine transformation and how it influences the battle action that’s described. Mr Dick provides three dependent campaigns starting in mid 1944 that will drive the Germans back into Eastern Europe; showing how these campaigns fit within this transformed operational doctrine. The coverage will also show how Stalin’s political desires to control Europe after the defeat of Germany influences this doctrine. (The three campaigns were the Belorussian Offensive beginning on June 23; the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive on July 13 and finally the smaller Yassi-Kishinev Offensive in late August. The reasons for these specific campaigns are given and how these battles fit into the bigger strategy for winning the war is explained. This series of battles clearly show the Soviet operational strategy had been transformed and was working.)The battle coverage of these campaigns is not exhaustive but it’s more than ample to show the concepts and implementation of the Soviets’ transformed doctrine. The terrain; weather; deception techniques; logistics; enemy deployments are just some of the considerations taken to construct this three battle sequence. The author shows how this series; compared to alternatives; will gain the Soviets the best and quickest way to victory. The analysis is good and will help many of us to understand the changing tide of war on the east front. A discussion of the similarities and differences of military doctrine between the Allies was also interesting and helpful. Coverage also includes German strengths and weaknesses; especially its poor and ever changing strategic planning that drastically worked against its strengths. There is analysis at the end of each chapter plus a final conclusion at the end of the book that will tie everything together.Though briefly mentioned I believe the author should have developed the impact of the following issues more fully on the German results in the east. The loss of the African Forces in 1943 and of course the buildup of forces in Southern and Western Europe in 1943-44 to meet the imminent invasions was a detriment. The approximate 160 divisions that the Germans either lost in African or were deployed in Europe had a significant impact on how the Germans defended themselves in the east; making it easier on the Soviets. The second front definitely helped the Soviets. Another issue that should have been developed to get a clearer picture of why the Soviets came back to win was the huge aid program the Western Allies provided to Stalin. By the start 1944 the relief program was at its height and providing the Soviet Armies with Jeeps; trucks; armor; locomotives; food; communication equipment; natural resources etc. that clearly raised the Soviet’s performance. The Soviet success was mainly their doing but they had help that clearly shorten the war. Including this aspect would not detract from the Soviets' accomplishments and it would give greater insight to the new students.Mr Dick adds a few maps; a worthy Notes section; a Bibliography and an Index to assist the reader if further study is desired.This is a well constructed; interesting presentation with plenty of analysis and reflection that will aid and give insight to newcomers to the War and will be appreciated by the experienced student.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Something DifferentBy Thomas ReiterFirst off; for the reasons described below; I would probably rate this book as four and a half stars if I could; but since I can't I decided to round up...As usual; the rating for this book depends on what you're expecting it to be; and this book is quite different from most English-language histories of the Russian Front; because it provides more analysis of some of the militarily significant factors in several battles (speed/rate of advance; correlation of forces; logistics considerations; etc.); rather than a mere recounting of a the battle itself. This is actually a very Soviet/Russian approach to military history; but I think that the author does a good job of presenting it in an interesting informative manner.Potential readers should understand that this is not a book with lots of personal anecdotes ala Paul Carrell or Stephen Ambrose. It is also not a minute recounting of every maneuver in a battle; ala Glantz. Rather; it is more of an analysis of Soviet operational art as it developed during the war; although it does include decent accounts of 3 operations in 1944 to help flesh out the analysis: Bagration (Belorussia); L'vov-Sandomir; and Jassy-Kishinev; as well as a good summary of the evolution of Soviet operational art prior to 1944. All of this is quite interesting and well written.A few comments about what would have led me to subtract half a star (if I could...):1) While the book includes a few maps; it would have benefited from inclusion of more maps.2) A good portion of the book (5% according to my Kindle) consists of a chapter called "Reflections on the Future" which frankly does not have anything to do with the rest of the book other than that; yes; Soviet/Russian operational art continues to evolve. Not sure why the author thought it made sense to include this kind of chapter in a book about the "Eastern Front; Summer 1944";3) The author uses Clausewitzian/Soviet jargon such as "culmination" a bit too much for my taste.Anyway; generally a very good; well-written book that I would recommend to anyone with a decent knowledge of the Russian Front and trying to understand why the Russians were successful in 1944-45.