This is the first modern scholarly look at the little-known yet remarkable USS New Ironsides--America's first seagoing ironclad and the only one to see combat in the American Civil War. It describes the design; construction; and wartime career of the armored frigate; which included sixteen months of combat off Charleston; South Carolina; where she fired more shots than all of Rear Adm. John Dahlgren's monitors put together and caused the Confederates to offer $100;000 for her destruction. The 1865 assault against Fort Fisher led Adm. David Dixon Porter; a hard man to impress; to call the ship the best in the fleet for offensive operations. Here; a former surface warfare commander chronicles New Ironsides's entire story; from inception as the Navy's insurance policy in 1861 through the straining urgency of construction and blockade service in the stormy early months of 1863 to the hard-fought engagements at Charleston Harbor and Fort Fisher. He places the ship in a broader context of warship design during a period of rapid technological change. He also reexamines the circumstances of 1861 to debunk the myth that the ironclad was a regressive design created by mossbacked naval traditionalists. This complete assessment of the ship's career shows both her operational and technical superiority. It also explains why; despite the success demonstrated by New Ironsides; the monitors dominated the Union ironclad program.
#348141 in Books 2002-05-01Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.40 x .90 x 5.50l; 1.00 #File Name: 1557095574328 pages
Review
8 of 8 people found the following review helpful. Pretty prophetic given when it was writtenBy David W. GriffinAn interesting; good story; and given that it was written in the 20s; a fairly prophetic prediction of the Pacific part of World War II. Some things; the author gets right and some he gets wrong.Right? Japanese sneak attack; not on Pearl Harbor; but on another critical part of the American War effort; perhaps just as bad as Pearl. He envisions the initial Japanese victories; the delay while the US builds up its forces; and the slow island hopping to recapture the Pacific. He even shows some of the deception the allies used against Germany; only against Japan in the book. The small unit actions were similar to what I've read of the Guadacanal fights. The long range efforts with submarines and mining were interesting and not dissimilar to reality. The critical nature of Japan's supply and raw materials problem were showcased.Wrong? No Pearl Harbor (despite the blurb on the book). The Japanese in the book treated their prisoners with respect according to the Geneva convention unlike the real Japanese. The Japanese in the book weren't so fanatical that they'd flight man; woman and child to the last person. The final peace was negotiated; though the Japanese were clearly on the losing side. Airpower in the book; though important; didn't have the decisive nature that it had in WWII -- there was still an epic battleline fight as at Jutland. The japanese in THIS book were the Japanese from the Russo Japanese War -- clients of the British. Lastly; our real war was part of another World war; not an isolated war between the US and Japan.Even so; if the Japanese DID read this book; they should have read to the ending because all the issues that led to their failure were right there to read -- lack of raw material; inability to replace their man and material losses; dependency on sea lines of supply; dependency on overseas possessions; etc.In the Russo Japanese war; the Japanese learned (or thought they did) that they could take on a huge world power and win if they could roll up some victories in the early stages. They never invaded Russia it's true; but Russia had other problems that prevented them from an all-out war on Japan. Those same issues weren't going to keep the US from winning this one. If Russia had attacked Japan the way Russia attacked Germany in World War II they may have drawn different conclusions.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. This book was best seller when it came out in 1925 and remained ...By Charles KovacsThis book was best seller when it came out in 1925 and remained popular and even influential for many years. It was/is about a war between the US and Japan in 1931-33. The author was clearly familiar with the navies of those countries; though some of the ship names mentioned in the book struck me fictitious and the USN seemed to have a lot more cruisers than in the real world. Perhaps they were assumed to have been built in 1926-31; but in fact; there was virtually no naval construction in the US in those years. The section on China struck me as very optimistic in relation to the country's condition in 1925.This is a 1920's version of the WWIII books of the 1970's and 1980's and it is well written. There are some characters to give the story some color. but none are developed sufficiently. All the same; this fictitious naval war was interesting; especially in the light of the war in the Pacific in WWII; and it could also be a good basis for a naval war game. The book is well written; it is reasonably priced and should be particularly useful for those interested in modern naval warfare.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Extrapolating The FutureBy ecpenszynskiHector Bywater in this book brings to mind a book written by Erskin Childers in the very early 1900s called 'Riddle of the Sands' dealing with a hypothetical Imperial German Invasion of England written Pre-WWI .... although Bywater's view of the hypothetical Pacific War that actually unfolded a decade after he published this book is much more strategic and far reaching. In this book Bywater draws common sense conclusions from facts then at his disposal which do indeed paint a generally accurate picture of the future from his persepctive in the 1930s and this is what makes the what-ifs of history so relevant for our own future. I can remember President Kennedy commenting on a book he had read about World War I called the 'Guns of August' while in the midst of the Cuban Missle Crisis. He was desperatly troubled by repeating the mistakes; diplomatic and military; that led to World War I in his confrontation with the Soviets. Fortunately Kennedy prevailed over the Militarists and Workd War III was averted. If only Hector Bywater would have had an ear in the White House that could take him seriously maybe just maybe the ACTUAL Pacific War might have been less costly if it occured at all. We can indeed learn from Alternate History. This book is an excellent read !
