ePub Gunfire Around the Gulf : The Last Major Naval Campaigns of the Civil War by Jack Coombe in History

Review

11 of 12 people found the following review helpful. Bad editing; or poor research?By Stephen A. SkubinnaI was delighted when I discovered this book - the naval side of the Civil War has been often ignored or treated as a sideshow; when a compelling case could be made that the blockade plus the gradual reduction of the Confederacy's seaports was decisive. One could even argue that barring total catastrophe on the ground or massive foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy; the Union dominance of the seas made eventual victory inevitable.This book falls far short; sadly. It is spoiled by glaring inconsistencies and sheer wrong information. Ship tonnages and dimensions are reported inconsistently - I suspect that the author is unaware of the different definitions of tonnage; and mixes up displacement and measurement figure. Various drafts and depths are reported - and in the coastal and riverine environment of the naval war in the Gulf; ships' drafts were perhaps the single most important factor in operations. Numbers and calibers of ships' armaments are wrongly reported - the author appears to have no understanding of the differences between shell and shot; rifles and smoothbores; broadside and pivot mountings (CSS Sumter did not carry a "1 inch rifle;" and such a ludicrous remark should never had made it past the intital proofs). Personalities' ranks are given inconsistently; often we encounter a character early on identified by the rank he held later in the war.Minor technical details? Most such details determined the tactics used and operations planned. Further; such sloppiness casts doubt on the integrity of the author's research and his editor's attention to his job.There are problems other than the technical ones noted above. The author claims that the US Navy destroyed the maxim that wooden ships could not successfully engage shore fortifications. The British and French had already demonstrated the falsity of that belief during the Crimean War; in both the Baltic and the Black Seas. The author claims that Porter's mortar fleet was a major factor in the assault on New Orleans; when in fact they were irrelevant to the Union success.All in all; a very disappointing performance in writing history. This book does little to advance its stated intent.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Really poor effort that should not have been publishedBy N. WallachDuring the American Civil War; the naval forces did not play too major of a role as most of the action was on land; but that was also partially due to the success of the Federal Navy as it tightened a blockage around every major Southern port. Author Jack Coombe has decided to write a series of books documenting all the major naval battles and this volume is his opus regarding the Major Naval Campaigns in the Gulf of Mexico. Unfortunately; his writing style and descriptions are rather amateurish and bombastic and so I completed reading this book while continuously shaking my head in wonder as to why it was published.Let me point out just a couple of items:- When giving the history of Louisiana; the author tells us that the colony was held by a company that was organized by a certain John Law and that this company was organized in 1831. In 1722; New Orleans becomes the capital of the colony; and then in 1731; John Law's company returns the colony to the French crown. All these dates come from the same paragraph. In addition to the fact that the sequence is nonsensical; did no one check those dates? (New Orleans succeeded Biloxi as the capital in 1723; and John Law's company was responsible for the "Mississippi Bubble" which erupted in 1720. By 1733 John Law had been dead for four years).- Every fleet or even ship is described in flowery terms like: "Powerful"; "Magnificent"; "formidable"; and the like. I think each of these terms is used several hundred times throughout this 202 page book! Also; it makes it less than believable when the term "powerful" is assigned to a gun boat that boasts one gun and when another ship is deemed "formidable" when it had twelve guns. These events occurred not that long after the British and French Navy fought each other with ships boasting 70 to 100 guns; so what makes these puny ones so formidable? There is never an explanation given.In addition to things like this; the story line is not told in any way that makes sense. The first 50 or so pages bounce around between the Confederates problems in creating a Navy to what Grant was doing at Ft. Donelson to the Federal Navy. There are also multiple passages that are repeated in several chapters and the timelines bounce around in no discernible order. The last half of the book is a paean to Admiral Farragut - but at least that part is told in order.Should you bother reading this book? I would suggest you not bother; but rather look for others if you are interested in the Naval aspects of the Civil War. I have read many other books that told the stories much better with better analysis and more comprehensive; yet understandable; treatment than this one. About the only thing that this author contributed as a positive thing was that he injects - twice - his experiences as a sailor during World War 2 when he explains what it's like for the sailors to stand watch day after day; and week after week. Aside from those few paragraphs; the rest of the book is really not up to par.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Far From DefinitiveBy Nathan AlbrightThis book has a horrible title; and its front cover text is full of a great deal of false advertising. For one; the title of this book would make one believe that it dealt with the end of the Civil War; but instead it takes a chronological look at the naval history of the Civil War from start to finish. Additionally; it claims to be the authoritative history of the Civil War’s most crucial naval battles; but it looks mainly at the Gulf naval war; with short discussions of the naval war on the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Coast; without much detail; and while it covers in some depth the early naval efforts that saved Florida’s main forts in Key West and Pensacola for the Union; the seizure of Ship Island and New Orleans; the unsuccessful efforts to take over Galveston; and the Mobile Bay campaign; it is not as if this book is complete when it comes to the Gulf of Mexico either; totally ignoring the First And Second Battles of Ft. Brooke (now Tampa) as well as the pivotal role of the Gulf Squadrons in moving troops around for the Rio Grande Campaign and Natural Bridge Campaigns at the very end of the Civil War.In terms of its organization and structure; the book is very straightforward. It is about 200 pages of solid reading material; a good length; and it goes into a great deal of detail about the efforts to hold and seize New Orelans and Mobile; which are the core of the book. There are some chapters on other military endeavors relating to blockading and blockade running and commerce raiding; some comments about the unjust nature of post-battle decisions on both the Union and rebel side; and even some references to primary source material about poetic Confederate officers and bored sailors tired of doing the same drills over and over again. Even those who have never been involved with naval campaigns can relate to that; as well as to the complicated way that people received positions of honor and glory; and how defeat meant that someone needed to to be affixed with the blame. None of that will be unfamiliar to many readers as well.At its core; this is a book that argues that the talent between the Union and Confederate side was close to even (the author makes an implicit contrast between Welles and Mallory as being roughly equal in sheer administrative talent; and between Semmes and Farragut being on the same level); but that the immense superiority in logistical capacity for the North is what led to victory. This seems a fair conclusion to me; yet it neglects the reality that the Confederacy was aware of its logistical shortcomings vis-a-vis the North before engaging upon their course of rebellion; believing that their superior military talent and general military culture would trump the obvious advantages in men and materiel possessed by the North. The rebels were wrong; the logistical advantage of the Union was too great for the rebels to overcome; especially as the North was at least the equal on a general by general and soldier by soldier level; given the nearly equal casualties despite the fact that the South was fighting on home terrain and had interior lines; where one would expect the attacker to have twice the casualties of the defenders. This book is merely more evidence to demonstrate the importance of logistics in warfare; a lesson that military readers and leaders forget at their peril. For that alone; despite its flaws; it is a worthwhile book.