The confrontation between German and Soviet forces at Stalingrad was a titanic clash of armies on an unprecedented scale—a campaign that was both a turning point in World War II and a lasting symbol of that war's power and devastation. Yet despite the attention lavished on this epic battle by historians; much about it has been greatly misunderstood or hidden from view—as David Glantz; the world's foremost authority on the Red Army in World War II; now shows. This first volume in Glantz's masterly trilogy draws on previously unseen or neglected sources to provide the definitive account of the opening phase of this iconic Eastern Front campaign. Glantz has combed daily official records from both sides—including the Red Army General Staff; the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs; the German Sixth Army; and the Soviet 62nd Army—to produce a work of unparalleled detail and fresh interpretations. Jonathan House; an authority on twentieth-century warfare; adds further insight and context. Hitler's original objective was not Stalingrad but the Caucasus oilfields to the south of the city. So he divided his Army Group South into two parts-one to secure the city on his flank; one to capture the oilfields. Glantz reveals for the first time how Stalin; in response; demanded that the Red Army stand and fight rather than withdraw; leading to the numerous little-known combat engagements that seriously eroded the Wehrmacht's strength before it even reached Stalingrad. He shows that; although advancing German forces essentially destroyed the armies of the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts; the Soviets resisted the German advance much more vigorously than has been thought through constant counterattacks; ultimately halting the German offensive at the gates of Stalingrad. This fresh; eye-opening account and the subsequent companion volumes—on the actual battle for the city itself and the successful Soviet counteroffensive that followed—will dramatically revise and expand our understanding of what remains a military campaign for the ages.
#1559595 in Books University Press Of Kansas 2001-06-20Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.02 x .88 x 5.98l; 1.47 #File Name: 0700610952344 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Mao's generals still toe the party line.By David J. MooreMao's Generals is a fascinating read. most of the memoirs are quite frank. There is some pathos as in the narrative about the death of Mao's son in a napalm attack on Marshal Peng's headquarters.The writers sometimes bring out old chestnuts such as "the Americans and their puppets started the war by invading the north June 25th 1950." I know better because I was there and they know better too. They claim victory in what was at best a result where the ROK was preserved. The Chinese commanders were skillful and brave but they employed tactics which disregarded the lives of their soldiers. That they claim "victory" when they lost an estimated one million dead is preposterous.3 of 5 people found the following review helpful. The Updated Short History of the Chinese Army's Operations in the Korean War!By Gilberto VillahermosaWhy did the Chinese Communist intervene in Korea in 1950?How did the Chinese Communist Forces fight the war?What lessons did the Chinese learn from their combat experience?These are the key questions that editors Xiabing Li; Allan R. Millet and Bin Yu seek to answer from the Chinese perspective in this groundbreaking narrative of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.When Communist China intervened in the Korean War in 1950 it did so on a massive scale. According to Chinese statistics; more than 2.3 million combat troops entered Korea and engaged in the war. By the time China withdrew its forces from Korea in 1958 some twenty-five infantry armies; sixteen artillery divisions; ten armored divisions; twelve air force divisions (consisting of 672 pilots and more than 59;000 ground service personnel) and six security guard divisions had participated in the war.China also mobilized some 600;000 laborers for the war. Thus a total of 3 million Chinese Volunteers eventually fought in the Korean War.Chinese casualties from October 1950 to July 1953 totaled more than 1 million men; including 152;000 dead; 383;000 wounded; and 450;000 hospitalized; as well as almost 22;000 prisoners of war and 4;000 missing in action. The was cost China more than $3.3 billon and Chinese forces consumed 5.6 million tons of good and supplies during their invention; including the loss of 399 aircraft and 12;916 vehicles.We know all of this because the Chinese military leadership at the time of the war tell us so in this brilliant new history of the Korean War.This collection of memoirs of the Chinese generals involved in the war is; for the most part; largely issue-oriented and focuses on matters such as decisino-making; operational plans; battle commands; field communications; combat organizations; political mobilization; logistical service; and truce negotiations."Mao's Generals Remember Korea" is thus the updated short history in English; based on Chinese sources; of the Chinese army's operations in the Korean War. It is an important work because it demonstrates that the People's Republic of China has drawn and continues to draw military; diplomatic; and strategic lessons from the war it fought fifty years ago with the world's most powerful military - the United States armed forces.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. PR China's First War--Their General's ViewBy John Richard SchrockMAO'S GENERALS REMEMBER KOREA is a collection of primary sources translated and edited by Xiaobing Li; Allan R. Millett; and Bin Yu; published by the Univ. Press of Kansas in 2001; 303 pages hardcover.As a child; my first memories are of radio commentary by "Gabriel Heater and the News" broadcasting about the Korean War. I was six years old. Eisenhower had been elected on a promise to bring the soldiers back home and that may be the most many Americans remember about this forgotten U.N. "police action." If M*A*S*H had not become a hit; many in the current generation would not even know we fought in Korea (although it has never really ended-we technically remain only in a continuous state of cease fire). We fought in this U.N. "police action" along with many Western allies; although the predominant forces were American. However; media coverage of the Vietnam War has given many Americans the understanding that we do not always fight in black-and-white situations; where we are always good and the enemy is always bad. Interestingly; the war-cynical M*A*S*H series served through fictional episodes to paint the Korean War in the ambiguity that it deserves.For the new People's Republic of China; this was their first challenge to enter an external war in the aid of an ally. This book provides access to the perspective of China's generals in memoirs only now available and long after our Western generals had described our perspective. These are the primary sources: the view of Marshals Peng Dehuai; Xu Xiangqian; and Nie Rongzhen; Generals Du Ping; Hong Xuezhi; and Chai Chengwen. The maps at the end of the book clearly track the progress of the war. To call any of these entries "propaganda" is to fall back in nationalistic ethnocentrism. Some of the Chinese generals write to speak to logistic details; others write to describe the political and military reality of that time; as they saw it; to a future generation who will have difficulty understanding the context.The Chinese officials overestimated the enemy killed; just as we over-reported deaths in Vietnam. But the war technology superiority we held provided far less advantage than we expected. Chinese generals describe the soil literally plowed by the impact of small munitions to the point any handful of dirt would hold bullets and shell fragments; and yet they survived such bombardment to emerge and drive the UNF to the 38th parallel. Begun barely a year after the consolidation of China under Mao; this war looms as just as important in PRC history as WWII holds in U.S. history-as the editors note. If we are ever to understand why North Korea still marshalls the fifth-largest standing army in the world; we must understand this history. This war still lingers in the memory of the eldest North Koreans and permeates into the next generations' storyline.Meanwhile China has moved on. Although the perspective of the new market-economy China toward modern North Korea today is completely different than in the early 1950s; it is obvious that this war shaped China's military perspective toward superior Western military technology (you can still win against more modern technology and enemy control of the air; but at great human cost).Walk through the Korean War Memorial in Washington DC some cold winter day. Our memorial statues; in contrast to the attitudes of generals on both sides; rightly show there is no glory in this war. The contrasting perspectives shown by such books as this reveal how history is written differently.John Richard Schrock
