Abu Sa‘id ‘Abd al-Hayy Gardizi was an author and historian living in the mid-eleventh century at the height of the Turkish Ghazvanid dynasty. His only known work; The Ornament of Histories (Zayn al-akhbir); is a hugely ambitious history of the Eastern Islamic lands AD 650-1041; spanning what is now Eastern Iran; Afghanistan and parts of the Central Asian Republics and Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Gardizi's text is an extremely rare source of primary information about the rise of Islamic faith; culture and military dominance in these regions; and represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the early Islamic world. This is the first English translation of the original Persian text; and is accompanied by an introduction and commentary which details the historical; geographical and cultural context.
#563625 in Books Osprey Publishing 2006-04-25 2006-04-25Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 245.62 x .18 x 7.29l; #File Name: 184603017X96 pages9781846030178
Review
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Objective and refreshing look on the Moscow Operation.By Nate LRobert Forczyks coverage of Operation Typhoon is a well researched and objective view; something Mr. Forczyk seems to have a reputation for. The book starts with an introduction to the situation of Operation Barbarossa; opposing forces and commanders and their orders of battle; then proceeds into Army Groups centers operations from September through December of 1941; highlighting the real reasons why the offensive ground to a halt; avoiding the "stuck in the mud/cold" and "Hitler didn't let us pack clothes" narratives that have been peddled/exaggerated too far and presents the more relevant issues: poor logistics stemming from railroad impediments (mainly fuel); poor motorization of the Wehrmacht; less than optimal generalship.That being said; the book has a few shortcomings; mainly the use of a few tactical-level 3D maps that are obscured by the books binding and short length (just shy of 100 pages); however these seem to be the fault of Ospreys format and not Mr Forczyks fault entirely.Overall; this is an excellent; objective and researched look into the Battle of Moscow. I will certainly be buying more books with the name "Forczyk" on them.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. A Very Good Succinct Overview of the Campaign Plus Destroys Many of the Myths Surrrounding the BattleBy YodaThe author; Dr. Robert Forczyk; Phd in International Relations and author of about a dozen very good books in the Osprey series (of which this book is a part of) and of hundreds of very informative reviews of military books; once again performs a well done job within the limited confines of the Osprey Campaign series; especially the relatively short book length (about 90 pages; of which a good third is illustration). In his history; Dr. Forsyth presents a very high level history; usually only describing events at the highest levels. Like in books written by Dr. David Glantz; Professor at the U.S. Army War College in Carlyle; PA; nearly all analysis is at the army and corps levels; some at the divisional and almost none below that.Dr. Forcyk starts off by describing the strategic position of Germany and the Soviet Union vis-Ã -vis each other before the campaign (including territorial and military disposition of forces); the fact that Hitler was very apprehensive and not at all enthusiastic about attacking on this axis (his general staff was able to convince him otherwise however) and that Stalin and STAVKA expected Germany to continue along the paths of attacks it was then pursuing (Leningrad and in the South). The book then provides a very succinct but good overview of the leaders of each side. Not just their experience and qualifications but their relationships amongst each other and with their respective national leaderships. He also delves into the general quality and leadership at lower levels in the armies as well. More than high level leadership is covered.Then Dr Forcyk goes into the campaign itself; not only in terms of direct military forces involved but also; just as importantly if not more so; their supply dispositions. This discussion is rather drab (how can a discussion of logistics not be?) but is of considerable importance as the German lack of supplies was probably the most important factor contributing to their failure. Dr. Forcyk points out that the Germans only had about 1.5 times their normal allocation of fuel and resources for the campaign - a general campaign like this would normally require 4 times as much.The author then goes about discussing the progression of the campaign in detail. In doing so he shatters many of the popularly held myths surrounding the battle. There was no influx of "Siberian Troops" who arrived; for example; en masse at the last moment to save the day. The Russian winter and its effects did not impact the battle until only after the German army was stopped - hence it was not the decisive factors so widely believed. The Soviet Union did not have a strong armored force in reserve in the region with which to counter the Germans. Stalin had foolishly squandered most of his reserves in piecemeal counter-attacks during the battle despite Zhukov's opposition. Ironically; one of the major keys to Soviet victory lay in the cavalry divisions that had escaped German encirclement (specifically from Guderian's troops) and that Stalin had so looked down upon.In short; not only a very good succinct history of the development and progress of the battle itself but also a good analysis of the factors behind the German failure and Soviet success. Quite a feat for a short book of only about 40 some pages in text. For the hour to hour and a half it takes a reader to read this; an excellent investment in time.7 of 8 people found the following review helpful. Excellent Operational History; Dubious ConclusionsBy Richard PetersonWith the notable exception of about two pages towards the end; this book by Robert Forczyk is an outstanding operational history of a critical battle of World War 2.Moscow 1941 follows the standard Osprey format. The sections on the origins of the campaign; the opposing plans and the opposing forces do a first-rate job of setting the scene. Only the section on opposing commanders is disappointing. In his reviews of earlier Campaign volumes; Forczyk laments that only the highest level commanders are discussed. Instead; he covers so many he doesn't have room to say anything meaningful about most. The Soviet commanders do a bit better; but then fewer are covered. Due to the size of the forces involved; the order of battle only goes down to the division level; the rapid turnover of Soviet divisions and even armies limits the value of their part.It's when he gets to the actual battles that Forczyk really takes off. His narration is crisp; well-written and understandable; despite the complexity of the action. The maps; as usual in the more recent Campaign volumes; are excellent and help greatly in following the action. Due to the scope of the campaign; he is mostly operating at the level of divisions; corps and even whole armies; mostly; but not entirely. We follow Kampfgruppe Eberbach through most of the campaign and see what a regiment with a bold leader and enough gasoline can accomplish; even in a battle involving hundreds of divisions; and what happens when the gasoline runs out. The 3D maps are used to bring several of the smaller-scale actions to life; even the full-color battle scenes are used (quite effectively) in this way. Unfortunately; all this detail leaves only four pages and a map to cover the Soviet counteroffensive. Still; it is impressive what he is able to cram into 96 pages.Along the way; Forczyk explodes any number of myths: from the Siberian reinforcements (mostly poorly trained) to weather (not as important as claimed) to Hitler's interference (largely non-existent) to any number of things. He also explains in detail the importance of logistics; how it really worked; and its impact throughout the campaign. He has the numbers to back it up - sometimes too many to easily digest.Then we come to his conclusions. Hitler's dismissal of eight top generals was "hardly a purge"; Hitler should have sacked more. We are also told that "Typhoon was a flawed plan; executed poorly." There is a long and more specific list of German errors. This might be another case of "myth busting"; except Forczyk's own words bust him. It is hard to disagree when he tells us Kluge should have been sacked; but Hoepner; he tells us earlier; was made a scapegoat because he was anti-Nazi; there are mitigating factors; at the least; for the others. By his own numbers; Typhoon was the most successful encirclement battle ever. Pretty good for a flawed plan; executed poorly. He treats the Soviets equally harshly.The problem seems to be that Forczyk doesn't accept that; when intelligence is limited and a commander is forced to make decisions on the fly - in other words; the normal conditions of war - mistakes are inevitable. When enumerating German errors; he also forgets that; in the first phase; Moscow was not the target; the Soviet armies in front of Moscow were. Even in the second phase; Moscow was not Hitler's highest priority. Under the circumstances; the attempt to take Moscow was the real mistake; but that is far more obvious in hindsight than it was at the time. In any case; the German army did not get as far as it had by playing it safe. Most interesting; but never mentioned; is that if you add up the figures he scatters through the text; Soviet losses must have been at least ten times the Germans'; probably more. If this is true; Moscow was a Pyrrhic victory of epic proportions. Stalin could lament; with Pyrrhus; that "another such victory will ruin me."So 94 pages are excellent and 2 are not. If you have any interest in this campaign; buy this book and draw your own conclusions.
