This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises―ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm―with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities―generally doesn't work. Based on historical case analysis of successful "under-fire" recovery and failure to recover; he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes; and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars "in real time." His proposed method combines conceptual; doctrinal; cognitive; command; organizational; and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that; when properly applied; this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises.
#633397 in Books Stanford University Press 1990-09-01Ingredients: Example IngredientsOriginal language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.06 x 2.21 x 6.13l; 3.61 #File Name: 08047183501276 pages
Review
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. The Japanese army left a good account of itself.By ben-YohananDetailed Study of the Nomonhan incident. It's really more like a lot of small and medium scale skirmishes for half of 1939. Despite losing diplomatically; the Japanese forces preform very well; while having lighter; and mostly inferior materiel; as well as some bad policies from military command. Disproportionate damage was done to Red army and Mongolian troops; which was quite unexpected to read. It goes into fantastic and technical detail of tactics used. This may seem a bit dry if you're looking for an engrossing narrative. But to me; the information is highly engrossing because I love reading this kind of material.This sheds some light on why Japan viewed its Kwangtung army (stationed in Manchuria) as its best. This army so no real action against US forces in the South Pacific; and primarily remained stationed in Manchuria. Their combat record is well documented in this book.4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. One of the best WWII-era operational military history books everBy M. PitcavageCoox's magisterial Nomonhan; which has stood the test of time extraordinarily well; is not only the best study of this particular obscure border battle between Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union in 1939; it is also one of the best World War II era operational level studies (though it extends far beyond operations in its scope).Moreover and most importantly; it is the single most impressive English-language book on the conduct of operations by the Japanese Army. Even though it describes a battle in Manchuria in 1939; anybody who reads this book will gain great insight into why the Japanese Army fought as it did (and fought so poorly) from 1941-1945. The IJA's lack of the heavy weaponry needed to conduct a modern war; its lack of emphasis on intelligence and reconnaissance; its impulsive leadership; its focus on will over weaponry; and perhaps most importantly the unusual and often self-defeating ways that the Japanese officer corps tended to react to tactical or operational setbacks; are all on full display here. Coox manages to present a portrait of the dynamics of the IJA that are almost unmatched in English.This is simply one of the most important reads for anybody seeking to understand the Japanese Army in the World War II era. It well repays the effort it takes to read such a long volume.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Authoratative and ExpansiveBy CustomerThis book as well as anatomy of a small war illustrate the Political and Military Tensions in the Far East 1931-1939 between Japan and Soviet Russia. The information of this confrontation between Japan and Soviet Russia requires significant contemplation of the reader to discern what exactly transpired in the events; for the reason that official reports tended to be altered for effect either for Political; Military; or Publicity means. The wealth of information has to be continually compared with after action and casualty reports as well as first hand statements throughout to dissipate the Fog of WAR.for example; units engaged may be larger than they are and considerably reinforced; as at Changkufeng and Lake Khansan. The Official Japanese reports of only the Japanese 75th Regiment holding off the Soviet 39 Corps for 10 days outnumbered 5-1 sounds heroic. Cross referencing TOP SECRET Japanese casualty reports published after the War included in this information discloses that the number of Japanese forces was 3 X what was estimated.The most valuable information is that on Soviet Operations.
