Christianity; not religion in general; has been important for American democracy. With this bold thesis; Hugh Heclo offers a panoramic view of how Christianity and democracy have shaped each other.Heclo shows that amid deeply felt religious differences; a Protestant colonial society gradually convinced itself of the truly Christian reasons for; as well as the enlightened political advantages of; religious liberty. By the mid-twentieth century; American democracy and Christianity appeared locked in a mutual embrace. But it was a problematic union vulnerable to fundamental challenge in the Sixties. Despite the subsequent rise of the religious right and glib talk of a conservative Republican theocracy; Heclo sees a longer-term; reciprocal estrangement between Christianity and American democracy.Responding to his challenging argument; Mary Jo Bane; Michael Kazin; and Alan Wolfe criticize; qualify; and amend it. Heclo’s rejoinder suggests why both secularists and Christians should worry about a coming rupture between the Christian and democratic faiths. The result is a lively debate about a momentous tension in American public life.
#672205 in Books 2006-09-30 2006-08-21Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.25 x 1.06 x 6.13l; 1.10 #File Name: 0674022416432 pages
Review
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. A Different EndingBy DougSince my father fought in World War II; I have always taken a keen interest in that period of history. I have often wondered what he thought and felt during that time. Like most vets of that era; he hardly ever talked about what had happened. This book; "Racing the Enemy" sheds some new light on that period of history. The battles are easy to document; but what drove people to fight is not always clear. This book shed new light on the intrigue during that very complicated time of almost a hundred years ago.6 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Racing the alliesBy Tom MunroBy 1945 Japan seemed well and truly beaten. Its navy and merchant fleet were on the bottom of the pacific. Its air force lacked fuel and was limited in what operations it could launch and its cities were being destroyed by Curtin LeMay's fire raids. One would have thought the unconditional surrender in 1945 unremarkable. The story was however more complex. Japan had only committed a small fragment of its army to the South East Asian and Pacific theatre. Most of its troops were in China and Manchuria. Even in 1945 it controlled a considerable empire including Malaya; Vietnam; what was to become Indonesia; Korea and a good deal of China. The Japanese Army had been transferring its army to the homeland. In addition it had some 9;000 aircraft which could be used as Kamikaze bombers. What the army hoped to do was to inflict a defeat on the American force that would invade Japan in 1945 and then obtain a favourable peace.In August the Japanese government tried to manoeuvrer the Soviets into acting as intermediaries in a negotiated peace. The Soviets however had other intentions. Stalin wanted to grab large parts of what had been the Japanese Empire. He was keen to intervene in the war so that he could extend his empire. He however kept these aims from the Japanese till he was ready to move.The strength of this book is that it shows that rather than the surrender of Japan resulting from one cause such as the dropping of the Atom bomb it was a combination of that and the Soviet attacks. The Soviets attacked the Japanese army in Manchuria with one and a half million men thousands of tanks and aircraft. The Japanese forces collapsed with the Soviets talking over Manchuria and North Korea.With this attack the hope that the Japanese had of inflicting a defeat on the Americans and using the Soviets as intermediaries collapsed. While that was happening two bombs were dropped that killed 150;000 or so people. It was this that led to the decision of the Emperor to back those in his cabinet who favoured peace.The book is one of the fullest outlines of the last days of the Japanese Empire. It also explodes a number of myths. For instance it is clear that Truman did not make a decision to drop the bomb. What he did was not to prevent the military making the decision to drop it. It would appear that he was keen to do so for the reasons of avenging Pearl Harbour and demonstrating to the Soviets the power of the bomb. Truman also had hoped that the existence of the bomb might have led to the end of the war before the Soviets could intervene. Stalin however was keen to get into the action and to grab parts of the far east. Thus it was a race to get into the war before Japanese resistance collapsed.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy Gary E.Good book for history buffs and students.
