Germany's Eastern Front in World War II saw many campaigns and battles that have been "forgotten" by a Soviet Union that tried to hide its military failures. The Red Army's invasion of Romania in April and May 1944 was one such campaign; which produced nearly 200;000 casualties and tarnished the reputations of its commanders. The redoubtable David Glantz; the world's leading authority on the Soviet military in World War II; now restores this tale to its proper place in the annals of World War II.Working from newly available Russian and long-neglected German archives—plus Red Army unit histories and commanders' memoirs—Glantz reconstructs an imposing mosaic that reveals the immense scope and ambitious intent of the first Iasi-Kishinev offensive. His re-creation shows that Stalin was not as preoccupied with a direct route to Berlin as he was with a "broad front" strategy designed to gain territory and find vulnerable points in Germany's extended lines of defense. If successful; the invasion would have also eliminated Romania as Germany's ally; cut off the vital Ploiesti oilfields; and provided a base from which to consolidate Soviet power throughout the Balkans.Glantz traces the 2nd Ukrainian Front's offensive along the Tirgu-Frumos; Iasi; and Dnestr River axes and the 3rd Ukrainian Front's simultaneous advance to the Dnestr River and dramatic struggle to seize bridgeheads across the river and capture Kishinev. He discloses General Ivan Konev's strategic plan as the 2nd Ukrainian Front prepared its Iasi offensive and fought a climactic battle with the German Eighth Army and its Romanian allies in the Tirgu-Frumos region in early May; then the regrouping of General Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front for its decisive offensive toward Kishinev; which aborted in the face of a skillful counterstroke by a threadbare German Sixth Army. Glantz describes how the Wehrmacht; with a nucleus of survived combat veterans; was able to beat back Soviet forces hampered by spring floods; while already fragile Soviet logistical support was further undermined by the Wehrmacht's scorched-earth strategy.Although Konev's and Malinovsky's offensives ultimately failed; the Red Army managed to inflict heavy losses on Axis forces; exacerbating the effects of Germany's defeats in the Ukraine and making it more difficult for the Wehrmacht to contain the Soviet juggernaut's ultimate advance toward Berlin. By re-creating this forgotten offensive; Glantz commemorates a rich and important chapter in the history of a war that brought down the German Army and reshaped the map of Europe.
#460256 in Books University Press of Kansas 1998-05-01Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 1.31 x 6.16 x 9.38l; 1.55 #File Name: 0700608796408 pages
Review
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Incredible DetailBy Richard CundiffThe maps of Corps/Armies deployments are worth their weight in gold. There is great detail on the make up of each Tank Division with level of training for the crews. You can't ask for a better book for status of the Red Army before Barbarrossa.16 of 20 people found the following review helpful. The first 6 months of WarBy Ryan OStumbling Colossus is a examination of the Red Army on the Eve of Operation Barbarossa. The books examines the Red Army and looks at the prepardeness for war and the prepartations being made for action against the Germans. The book looks at the largest army in the world and takes a pentrating look at the flaws in the system. We see why the Soviets were able to survive the disasters of the begining of the war and the causes behind some of these disasters.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Meticulously researched and very detailed but it can't overturn Viktor Suvorov's "Icebreaker"...By DimitriosThis book was written by the greatest authority Western World has produced on Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War as the definitive answer of the "politically correct" historians to Viktor Suvorov's groundbreaking book "The Icebreaker" which revealed for the first time to the whole world that Stalin planned a preemptive war against Nazi Germany and only lost the race of the first strike for just two weeks. Mr Glantz speaks Russian fluently and has studied Red Army and the Great Patriotic War for many years; having produced some of the most authoritative books ever written on the subject. Although he has digged deeper than anyone in the prewar Red Army archives and presents a wealth of material never before seen in the West; I felt that he couldn't erase the suspicion that Stalin wanted to smash the Nazis and "liberate" Europe when the Western Powers would be weakened by years of brutal war. I really enjoyed though the endless facts and figures that Mr Glantz provides in this book. The most interesting part is the chapter about the readiness status of the 20 Soviet Mechanized Corps - only two of them (1st and 6th) had a full complement of 1.000 tanks each or more on the eve of the German invasion; and most of the rest didn't posses even half that strength. The chaotic conditions of the initial phase of the war caused horrendous losses to the Soviets - in August 1941 most of the Mechanized Corps were left with just 50 tanks or fewer. The parlous state of the Red Air Force is also clearly depicted; as is the lack of training and the multitude of other problems that plagued the Red Army in 1941.In view of the devastating defeats that the Soviers suffered in the first months of Operation Barbarossa; one can hardly dispute the facts that Mr Glantz presents. The Red Army could not attack properly and efficiently even in the spring of 1942 when it suffered terrible losses at Kharkov. The books tries to prove that Soviet military operations in Finland and in Mongolia were also badly handled; caused heavy losses and revealed the crucial defects that the Great Purge caused to the Red Army high command.This book is perhaps the best source you could find on prewar Red Army; full of statistics and with excellent maps showing Red Army's order of battle; but view the facts with a heavy dose of skepticism after reading also Suvorov's book. The Red Army was obviously not ready in the summer of 1941 to wage war against the most experienced army of the era; but it couldn't afford to wait either for another year before striking first. For Stalin that was not going to be a war of choice anymore; since the Wermacht knocked out France and cornered Britain far faster than anyone could have imagined. Thus Stalin HAD to attack Germany in 1941 or suffer an attack himself. Mr Glantz is definitely right that the Red Army had many problems in 1941 but this fact doesn't prove that a Soviet preemptive strike against the Nazis was out of thinking. It was a strategic necessity for the Red Army; and Stalin simply was running out of time in the summer of 1941.
