In 1808 Napoleon dominated Europe; but the peace was not to survive for long. Todd Fisher continues his detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars with Austria's attack against Napoleon in 1809. Despite being defeated at Aspern-Essling; Napoleon rallied his forces and emerged triumphant at Wagram. With glorious victory behind him Napoleon now turned his attention to Russia and invaded in 1812. Yet the army was not the Grand Armee of old; and even the capture of Moscow availed him nothing. The foe remained elusive; the decisive battle remained unfought. This book tells the full story of the now legendary retreat from Moscow; as the fighting force that had vanquished Europe perished in the snows of the Russian winter.
#367796 in Books imusti 2016-05-24 2016-06-07Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.20 x 1.00 x 6.40l; .0 #File Name: 1783462787288 pagesPEN SWORD BOOKS
Review
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. A Required Read for serving members of the Military and those who want insight into both sides on the Eastern Front from 1943-45By Jim PhippsThis is a must read book for mechanized infantry and armor pros. Like the author; I was a armor officer. He brings rather unique insight into warfare on the Easter Front by both sides. He discusses in detail a number of operations; leaders; and armored vehicle development. He discussed equipment capability. This includes antitank guns; tank guns; and effect of armor on the tanks themselves.While not new to me he brings in solid insight into reliability issues with armor. Essentially Russian tanks were reliable and newer German tanks weren't. Many German Panthers burned up on road marches and never made it to the front.Other very important issues were logistics and why logistics literally stopped exploitation ops in their tracks; especially on the Russian side. An issue with the Germans was often spare parts and replacement engines.The small size of armor divisions due to losses were amazing. Both sides were not as effective as they should have due to very heavy losses. The difference as he discusses is that the Russians essentially outproduced the Germans with a minimal number of models of tanks. The Russians stuck with some BT60s BT70s with the T34-75s. It wasn't into later in the war that they upgraded to T34-85s to offset the effectiveness of the Tigers and Panthers on the German side. The German workhorses were obsolescent PZIIIs and eventually the newer PZIVs with the 75 mm KwK 40 L/43 gun .There is some discussion of US and British lend lease tanks plus the large scale use of US lend lease trucks. As was obvious; most allied lend lease tanks were limited to Russian Infantry Divisions.Overall; there us a lot to learn that can be applied even today in every unit from the platoon level to the Army level. It should be on every battalion's library and made to be required reading. Everyone should be able to see how the battles were won combined arms teams and lost even with mass by tank pure units.There is also good discussion on the need for artillery.9 of 10 people found the following review helpful. Very good work on the synergy of cultural organisation; logistics; planning and operations of armour on the eastern frontBy Fernando Wilson L.For me; the plus of this book is the organisational culture analysis the author provides both for the Panzerwaffe and; although understandably of lesser depth; for the Red Army forces too. The account of operations is reasonably deep for a volume of its length; but for me the greatest value is the critical analysis of the context of operations. For instance; the caption of a photograph of a german Tiger tank crew piling 88mm ammuntion on their vehicles engine deck as the hurriedly reload as a show of stress and danger was far more relevant than yet another descriptive narration of Prokhorovka ( . The weakness refered before of the rapid passing of the operations in Hungary at the end of the war is true; but once again; there are other works wich covert it ( Histoire collections; for instance). For me both these volumes are priceless as they provide far more depth to the understanding of the synergy between organisational culture; logistics; planning approaches and tactical capability of the armoured forces fighting on the eastern front than any other book I have had the pleasure of reading. Glantz or Healey do good jobs on their specifics approaches; but none has the specifics on the development of armour as the two volumes by Mr Forczyk. Fully recomended25 of 25 people found the following review helpful. Even if you have studied armored warfare for decades; Forczyk's book reveals crucial facts you hadnt known beforeBy Writing HistorianI thought that the topic of armored warfare on the Eastern Front offered little in the way of new perspectives with the exception of some of the Russian historians who are in the process of reexamining battles during the early phases of Barbarossa using Soviet primary sources. I discovered that belief to be singularly incorrect after perusing Robert Forczyk's second volume on Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front - a book that I almost didn't purchase but am glad that I did.Bottom line up front: This book is not intended to be a comprehensive and detailed account of every tank battle in the east during 1943 - 1945. Historian Emeritus David Glantz has written HOW MANY books about the Russo-German War and he still hasn't covered everything......Forczyk (rightly in my opinion) devotes the bulk of this book to the events of 1943 - which can rightfully be called the pivotal year in the east - rather than 1944 and 1945.That said; the only battle that I wish he had covered in more detail was the large-scale yet ultimately unsuccessful German panzer counteroffensive in Hungary in the closing weeks of the war. Let's face it; by that point in the conflict there were very few turreted panzers operating in the east OR the west. The bulk of the opposition offered to the Anglo-Americans and Russians came from towed AT guns; handheld AT weapons; and assault guns/tank hunters with fixed main armament.How is the book organized? A total of three chapters presented respectively as: CHAPTER 1 (pp. 1 - 36) covering the state of the armored forces on both sides at the beginning of 1943; production of armored vehicles for both sides during 1943; research and development leading to the introduction of new armored vehicles for both sides during 1943; changing tactics for both sides; the impact of Lend Lease (which Forczyk says has been underrated by Soviet and Russophile historians); while also focusing on topics dear to the Panzerwaffe enthusiast such as how Germany's armor was distributed and used on multiple fronts; with emphasis on the eastern front; how the different services (Heer; Waffen SS and Luftwaffe) went about acquiring panzers during this period; the impact of reduced logistical support on German armored units and the underestimated impact of the German defeat in Tunisia on events in Russia during 1943.CHAPTER 2 focuses on armored operations during 1943 (pp. 37 - 195). I won’t go through the laundry list of battles he examines; but they are numerous and include both German AND Soviet defeats/victories. I believe Forczyk does an exceptional job of showing how the German armored forces exerted a slowly decreasing influence on the operational level in Russia - in large part because of inadequate production of proven vehicles; siphoning of equipment from the Army by the Waffen SS and Luftwaffe; decreasing number of German officers with significant experience of employing armor in combat; and rushed introduction of the Panther and Tiger which resulted in their piecemeal appearance on the field of battle as well as significant maintenance issues. On the last named point - I hadn't realized that the Panther had maintenance issues not only at Kursk (poor final drives as well as overheating engines caused by rubberized bulkheads intended to facilitate wading but trapping engine heat instead) but also for the six months after that battle. He also shows how inexperienced commanders who thought Tigers were invincible often employed those vehicles incorrectly which led to unexpected German tactical defeats. The Soviets also made their share of mistakes and inexperienced commanders on THEIR side normally lost battles on a much larger scale than the Germans; result in one or more Tank Corps being destroyed.CHAPTER 3 (pp. 196 - 236) is entitled "Armored Operations in 1944" but it really includes both 1944 and 1945; with a distinct lack of coverage on the final year of the war. Although the coverage seems lopsided in favor of 1943; I believe that the previous "chapter" reveals most if not all of the worthwhile innovations and developments. Chapter 3 is really a straight forward account of how events and decisions taken in 1943 manifested themselves in the final two years of the conflict. It concentrates on operations around Leningrad during the first half of 1944; the defeat of Army Group South during that same period; the German defense of the Dniester River in April - May 1944 and Operation Bagration - the Red Army's summer offensive during June - August 1944. As I have already mentioned; events in 1945 are summarized in a section entitled "Epilogue" that consists of a mere four pages (pp. 233 - 236).The conclusion is allotted a brief three pages (pp. 237 - 239) which may seem a little shorter than one might expect but a lot of the analysis that many authors hold off presenting until they state their overall conclusions is found earlier in Forczyk's account. The most interesting point in this small section is Forczyk's restating of the importance of lend lease to the Russian armored force (he clearly makes it a point to note the accomplishments of Soviet tank units equipped with western manufactured armored fighting vehicles throughout the preceding text) by examining not only how hundreds of thousands of Studebaker trucks imparted an otherwise unobtainable tactical velocity to Soviet armor operations; but also pointing out other benefits the Soviets received in the form of supporting vehicles (reconnaissance; C2; mobile AA); radios; raw materials needed to make armor plating of good quality; and fuel.There are six appendixes - Soviet and German ranks; Armor Order of Battle 1 July 1943; Types of Tanks on the Eastern Front; 1943 - 44; Tank Production 1943; Armor Order of Battle 21 June 1944; and Tank Production 1944.Summary - In terms of strong points Forczyk brings impeccable research skills and experience based analysis to the table. In terms of weak points; he makes less use of primary sources than I would prefer and there are only about one-quarter of the needed maps in chapter 2.I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject with the caveat that it is not an exhaustive account of all tank battles during the period in question. Not only that; but I have developed a deeper respect for Forczyk's already considerable abilities as a researcher and writer as a result of reading this book. As a matter of fact; I have already pre-ordered his upcoming account of Operation Sea Lion sight unseen!
