The second part of H. P. Willmott’s three-volume history of the war in the Pacific; this work tells how Japan arrived at a situation in which war with the United States was the only means of ensuring long-term security and resolving her immediate problems of access to raw materials and of an unwinnable war in China. Totally balanced in presentation; the book also explains the basis of Allied miscalculations and provides explanations of the defeats that overwhelmed American; British; and Dutch forces throughout Southeast Asia in a little more than three months. Willmott argues that it was Japan’s concentration and economy of force that contributed to its success in that early campaign. It was a later decision to disperse forces over a large area; he says; that resulted in Japan’s loss of the Coral Sea and Midway battles and ultimately the entire war. The book’s stunning assessment of those battles offers insights and interpretations that continue to be discussed; twenty-five years after it was first published.
#587919 in Books 2014-04-15Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.90 x .90 x 6.00l; .90 #File Name: 1591142512264 pages
Review
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. A great book that captures the changing tide of Naval IntelligenceBy David E. MeadowsEasily one of the best historical works that reveal how the changing tide of Intelligence and Cryptology moved from behind the scenes where they played pivotal roles in winning World War II into the Combat Information Centers and front lines of Fleet warfighting operations. Amazing revelations how the British concept of fused intelligence prior to WW II became the foundation for the U.S. Navy's OPINTEL concept architecture. Lots of personal professional insight from some of the heroes of the modern Intelligence era such as Inman; Studeman; Haver; McConnell; Jacoby; Porterfield; and many others. An easy read that may make the reader think it was an easy process; but for the student of Naval Intelligence; those who served during this period of growth; change; and transition during the Vietnam and Cold War years - this book is strongly recommended for those who served this period as well as the young professionals who are following in the footsteps of these giants. Cheers; David E. Meadows; Capt-ret U.S. Navy1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Naval OPINTEL DevelopmentBy Silence DogoodWith use of many abbreviations for various naval intelligence centers; the developmentof naval operations intelligence ( OPINTEL ) is discussed beginning with radio intel-ligence units aboard WW2 carriers to the present day. This has resulted in joint-service assets containg integrated intelligence; surveillance and recon products toall commanders at a moments notice. They literally have more info than they canhandle.As far as examples where a commander had this "advantage"; there is very littlemention - most of them are one sentence in length. I expected more.5 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Intelligence in the Cold War as Leading to the FutureBy John MatlockThe stories of intelligence gathered from Signal Intelligence in World War II are well known. The development of ULTRA and MAGIC gave the Allied Admirals a significant advantage in the battles of the Atlantic and of course at Midway. This was really the start of intelligence moving from a dead end career to a position of some prominence in the Navy world.This book gives a bit about the history of operational intelligence during World War II but is mostly about the development of Naval operational intelligence after the end of the war.Our intelligence agencies took a hit in the aftermath of 9/11. Perhaps there was still too much orientation to the Cold War. Perhaps there was no orientation at all; just continuing business as usual. This book concludes with a chapter called Transition; Refocus; and the Future. This covers the time vrom the Goldwater-Nichols Bill which restructured the U.S. military command structure into a series of worldwide joint-service regional and functional commands. In the jargon of the services; many functions like OPINTEL went "Purple;" that is no more concentration on the White uniforms of the Navy; the Blue of the Air Force; or the Green of the Army. The change isn't complete; but experience has shown that an understanding of the past and the capabilities that were built up are the base upon which the organization of the future is built.The book is dedicated to the eighe Naval Intelligence shipmates who died in the Pentagon on September 11; 2001.
