ebooks The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union; 1923–1939 (The Wilder House Series in Politics; History and Culture) by Terry Martin in History

Review

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Changed the understanding of Soviet nationality policyBy Matthew LernerMartin's book has changed the way scholars interpret the history of Soviet nationality policy. His contention that the initial goals were to promote nationality and develop the lesser ethnic groups of the Soviet Union; and the way the USSR backtracked on this after the results were not what they hoped for; runs counter to previous understandings of the topic.The majority of the book consists of examining Ukraine in particular; with Belarus and Central Asia given notice as well. So while it doesn't look at the Soviet Union as a whole; it is possible to still extrapolate the arguments Martin puts forth for the other nationality groups involved. That said; Martin's extensive use of archival sources makes clear that while he focused on Ukraine; the ideas were brought forth to all parts of the USSR.For anyone who is serious about understanding Soviet nationality policy; this is a key book to read; as it has laid the foundation for modern studies on the topic.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. The Soviet Union Attempts to Deal With Its Many Nationalities. Alludes to the 1937-1938 Genocide of Soviet PolesBy Jan PeczkisUPDATE: This book is partly superceded by a new work that is based on Soviet archives: Please click on; and read my detailed review; of Operacja AntyPolska NKWD 1937-1938.---------------------------------------Terry Martin's book is based primarily on Soviet sources. Unfortunately; the author does not appear to approach his sources critically; and seems to take Soviet pronouncements too much at face value.There are already several other reviews which inform the reader about the general features of this book. My review emphasizes the fate of the Poles in the Soviet Union before WWII.This book includes interesting information. For instance; Belorussian-speaking Catholics often considered themselves Poles and demanded Polish education for their children; and the same was true of many Ukrainian-speaking Catholics. (p. 129).THE PARADOX OF COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISMCommunism is supposed to dismiss nationalism as the product of capitalism; and as something that is destined to fade away as the peoples develop authentic consciousness; which of course is class consciousness. A clue as to how the Soviet Union came to accommodate its many nationalities is provided by author Terry Martin; who writes; “Although Lenin always took the nationalities question seriously; the unexpected strength of nationalism as a mobilizing force during the revolution and civil war nevertheless greatly surprised and disturbed him. The Bolsheviks expected nationalism in Poland and Finland; but the numerous nationalist movements that sprang up across most of the former Russian empire were not expected. The strong nationalist movement in Ukraine was particularly unnerving. The direct confrontation with nationalism compelled the Bolsheviks to formulate a new nationalities policy.” (p. 2).POLITICAL CORRECTNESS RUN AMOKAt one level; nationalities did not exist in the Soviet Union. All the “Soviet citizens” were supposed to be equal; and criticism of others’ nationalities was punishable by law. For instance; a primary school teacher reported how she had almost lost her job after being denounced for repeating this Russian proverb in public; “‘An untimely guest is worse than a Tatar.’” (p. 389).NATIONAL VILLAGE SOVIETS IN BELORUSSIAThe author tabulates the soviets (councils) according to nationality and year. (p. 49). Thus; in 1926; there were 20 soviets; of which 2 were Polish and 11 were Jewish. In 1933; there were 93 soviets; of which 40 were Polish and 24 were Jewish.RESISTANCE TO COLLECTIVIZATIONPoles are identified by Martin as the ones most active in flights across the western border. (p. 320). In addition; Martin writes; “They [Poles] were also subjected to the greatest degree of popular and local Communist hostility during collectivization. The popular identification of Pole and kulak was summed up by the rhyme: ‘RAZ POLIAK—ZNACHIT KULAK.’ Poles were bluntly told; ‘you are being dekulakized not because you are a kulak; but because you are a Pole.’” (pp. 320-321).REPRESSION OF POLES IN THE SOVIET UNIONAlthough many nationalities suffered under Soviet rule; the Poles did especially so; and that not only during the Great Terror. For examples; see p. 330; 333; and 336.It was Nikolai Ezhov (Yezhov) who launched the anti-Polish part of the Great Terror; specifying how; and under what pretexts; Poles were to be arrested. (p. 337). Its scale is uncertain. Martin comments; “Unfortunately; we do not know exactly how many members of the diaspora nationalities were arrested or executed; since not everyone arrested in the Polish operation was a Pole; nor were all arrested Poles included in the Polish operation.” (p. 229).The targeting of Poles took on staggering dimensions. Author Terry Martin shows that; in the Leningrad oblast alone; and after their share of the population was pro-rated; Poles were 30.94 times more likely to be executed than non-Poles. (p. 339; 436). The figures for Odessa oblast were not much different. (p. 427).THE HOLODOMORAlthough author Martin does not use this term; he takes a middle view as to whether the Ukrainians were specifically targeted as an act of genocide; or whether the nationality of the victims was irrelevant. (p. 305). However; the main geographic foci of the HOLODOMOR were the North Caucasus and Ukraine. (p. 299). In any case; the stated goal was to crush the peasant resistance to collectivization. A commission headed by Lazar Kaganovich also blamed nationalist resistance; and called for savage repression. (p. 301).2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. A problem no one has resolvedBy R. L. HuffTerry Martin's long and complex book shows the ambiguous nature of multi-national policies in general; and not just as they pertain to the USSR. Despite some reviewers' critiques; Soviet nationality policy was neither an outgrowth of "the vagaries of Communist ideology" nor Europe's first 20th century attempt to deal with nationality dilemmas. The idea of federation was broached during the Provisional Government era in 1917; the fall of the second coalition regime in July was brought about partly by Ukrainian leader Hrushchevsky threatening secession if federation was not agreed to. Elsewhere after WWI other new states and old empires tried to walk the fine line between self-determination and autonomy: Austria-Hungary unsuccessfully; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - for a time - successfully.The Soviet Republic was also caught on its own propaganda petard: how to reconcile the land and resources (Ukrainian wheat and coal; Caucasian oil; Central Asian cotton) necessary for a planned and integrated economy; with socialist internationalism. Lenin's resolution of a USSR was opposed by Stalin; who favored an expanded Russian Federation. Multi-nationalism in itself; Stalin felt; was too divisive. After he assumed all Soviet power in the mid-30s; reversing Lenin's legacy in practice was one of his first priorities; returning to a de facto Greater Russia.As Martin demonstrates; the fractiousness of the original Soviet nationalities policy was all too apparent and proving Stalin essentially right. There were two solutions: to divide the Soviet Union into truly independent socialist states; prefiguring post-WWII eastern Europe; or impose central Muscovite authority. Affirmative action based on class and gender - also part of the Soviet cultural revolution - were likewise played against nationalism as competing sources of liberation. Seeing how national fault lines finally did bring the USSR down makes this dilemma all the more compelling. Martin - like Soviet nationality experts - seems to sidestep definitive solutions; suggesting there really were none.While America's melting pot ideology has worked only because it applied to a "nation of immigrants"; elsewhere the West seems not to have fared much better than the USSR with its multi-national experiments. The United Kingdom - which Soviet policy seemed to indirectly mimic - lost Ireland and the rest of its empire for the same reasons. Basques; Kurds; and Quebecois feel as aggrieved as Croats; Ukrainians; or Lithuanians (without the need for ideological blame). Martin has done a great service by probing this corner of Soviet history. Unfortunately others seem to take its findings to unwarranted conclusions.