PDF The Battle Of Bentonville: Last Stand In The Carolinas by Mark L. Bradley in History

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0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. A Masterful Work of Historical SIgnificanceBy KJAGThis is an in-depth and largely objective study of the climactic 3-day battle of Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign 19-21 March 1865 between Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s consolidated “Army of the South” and Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman’s veteran legions. As a bonus; an insightful overview is provided of the Carolinas Campaign leading up to the battle; including the chess-match maneuvering of opposing forces; the destruction; major skirmishes; and detailed coverage of the smaller battles of Averasboro and Monroe’s Crossroads.The book effectively covers the politics and stakes of the campaign and subject battle. It also profiles the key leaders on both sides and where relevant; their relationships; communications; activities; strategies; and tactics. The action is covered in detail as it plays out along with the chaos and carnage of battle; much of it in the words of those on both sides who were there; seamlessly woven into a compelling narrative. The author follows up with an analysis of the Bentonville battle.Essentially; Johnston’s all-out attack near Bentonville on day 1 to destroy Sherman’s left wing failed; despite having the element of surprise; a relatively sound plan; and sufficient numbers against Slocum's four divisions. The primary contributing factors included compounding delays and command-and-control issues among Johnston and some of his generals; combined with the spoiling reconnaissance–in-force of Carlin’s division and the stubborn resistance of Morgan’s Division; which bought the time necessary for Slocum to move his other two divisions up the road and deploy. Sherman is criticized for not bringing on a general engagement and possibly destroying Johnston’s Army on day 3; after Mower’s aggressive incursion with two brigades over-ran Johnston’s headquarters and came within a few hundred yards of the Mill Creek Bridge; his army’s only avenue of retreat. In retrospect; Johnston had repulsed Mower and was massing thousands of men and artillery in that area by the time Sherman could marshal forces to follow-up Mower’s assault. Had he attacked; there was no guarantee the bulk of Johnston’s Army would not have escaped; or that the war would have ended sooner even if Johnston had capitulated. As it was; additional casualties on both sides at Bentonville were spared in a war both Johnston and Sherman recognized at the time as all but over; and confirmed just weeks later as Gen. Robert E. Lee surrendered to Gen. U.S. Grant; followed by Johnston’s surrender to Sherman.If you are looking for a definitive work of historical significance covering the war in the Carolinas; this is it. Mark L. Bradley’s work is substantially balanced; meticulously researched; effectively supported by end notes; bibliography and numerous full-page battle maps; and is easy to read and comprehend. Similar superb works on the war in the Carolinas include Chris Fonvielle’s “The Wilmington Campaign” and Marion Lucas’ “The Burning of Columbia.” There are other good books; as well as a surprising number of books covering the Carolinas flavored by bias and/or flawed by spotty research and details; lack of maps; absence of notes and bibliography; and/or poor writing; organization; and editing. These defects are often not reflected in their reviews.ADDITIONAL SUPPORT MATERIALAn Order of Battle is provided down to the regimental level not only for the Bentonville Battle; but also for the smaller battles of Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign. An extensive tour of the Bentonville Battlefield is included with many modern photos and a corresponding map.BACKGROUNDSherman’s objectives upon setting out from Savannah 1 Feb 1865 with approximately 60;000 troops include bringing the war home to South Carolina—the “cradle of secession;” inducing Carolina soldiers to return home out of concern for family and property; destroying or denying use of most of the South’s last major war-supporting industries and resources; and subsequently linking up with Gen. Schofield’s 30;000 troops in Goldsboro before moving on to assist Grant with the end game in Virginia. Grant also sees the benefit of Sherman’s campaign in occupying or eliminating troops that may otherwise be made available to Lee.Jefferson Davis; faced with a crescendo of criticism and appeals from many in the Confederate Congress and other quarters (including Lee) to replace an ineffective Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard with Johnston; finally does so; despite his and Johnston’s mutual animosity. Johnston is instructed by Lee to stop Sherman; but his options are limited with a smaller army; being depleted daily by desertions. His patchwork army includes NC home troops; garrison troops; and veteran infantry and cavalry from Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and the remnants of the Army of Tennessee. Johnston’s plans call for defeating Union forces in detail by engaging each of Sherman’s two wings and Schofield separately. He believes the outcome of the war all but decided; but hopes his efforts may gain favorable terms for the South; and does not want to disappoint Lee. Johnston is not able to concentrate his forces until Sherman closes in on Goldsboro; where his army sets up in the path of Sherman’s left wing under an unsuspecting Gen. Slocum; beginning the opening act of the Battle of Bentonville 19 March 1865.OVERVIEWBeauregard; assigned to oversee the defense of the Carolinas; errs in assuming Sherman’s intentions and destinations; and how best to stop him. Led by Sherman’s misinformation and feints; he splits his forces to defend both Augusta and Charleston; but Sherman bypasses them while destroying the railway network as he moves on; effectively neutralizing their significance and leaving the defenders behind to play catch-up. Sherman instead moves on the SC capital of Columbia; left largely unprotected. Columbia is even more vital to the Confederacy as a major railway hub; military manufacturing center; and depot with huge stockpiles of ordnance and military equipment; supplies; food; and cotton that have not been evacuated. It is also host to key Confederate and state military offices and is symbolic to both sides as home of the secession movement.COLUMBIA (17-19 February): As Union troops enter the city; they observe smoldering cotton bales set afire in the streets by Hampton’s troopers. Leftover merchandise from stores and businesses broken into by Confederate cavalry is being carried off by civilians; and many of them hand out alcohol to passing Union troops. The mayor had asked Gen’s Hampton and Beauregard to destroy or remove the alcohol stocks before Sherman arrived; but they declined citing the alcohol as privately owned (as was most of the cotton that Hampton ordered burned).Fire consumes much of the city that night; with the majority of damage to the business district; where the buildings are packed together and many with common walls. Hampton later blames Sherman for the destruction; but Sherman blames Hampton. According to Lucas; maps detailing the destruction; prevailing winds at the time; and other evidence indicate the main firestorm started along Richardson Street; which was clogged with hundreds of cotton bales; with more stored in adjacent warehouses. Numerous civilians report other structures; including homes and public buildings; caught fire from embers raining down on rooftops; carried by high winds. Although some rogue; drunken Union troops likely contributed to the firestorm; up to 2;000 troops under the direction of Gen’s Howard; Logan; and Woods fight fires through the early morning hours. Two thirds of the city remains standing; including most homes and the new statehouse. Although there are physical altercations during the occupation; there are no reports of rape or murder. A handful of drunken; out-of-control Union troops are killed by the provost guards.Over the next two days Union troops destroy tons of ordnance and other military materiel as well as railways within a 15 mile radius of the city; along with 19 locomotives; freight cars; and rail repair machinery. The Confederate currency printing plant; Confederate and state armories; military factories; foundries; machine shops; and gun powder; cotton; and grain mills are destroyed.BATTLE OF MONROE’S CROSSROADS (10 March): Calvary commander Gen. Hampton; along with Gen’s Wheeler and Butler surround and spring a surprise attack before daylight to capture an unsuspecting Gen. Judson Kilpatrick and crush his smaller cavalry command. Kilpatrick does not have sufficient pickets posted; and Confederate cavalry overrun the camp along with the artillery and wagons; while sending a special detail to surround the home Kilpatrick is believed to be in; and is. But reminiscent of Gen. Hood at Spring Hill; TN where failure was snatched from the jaws of victory; a comedy of errors and audaciousness enable Union troopers to recapture their camp and equipment; and Kilpatrick and the bulk of his command escape. This results in finger-pointing after the war between the senior Confederate cavalry commanders.FAYETTEVILLE (11-14 March): Sherman destroys the large Confederate arsenal complex and obtains critical supplies brought up the Cape Fear River from Wilmington. He sends dispatches and Union sick and wounded on the boats’ return trip; and thousands of refugees trailing his army to Wilmington overland with a military escort in preparation for his final push on Goldsboro.BATTLE OF AVERASBORO (16 March): Kilpatrick runs into a stubborn skirmish line on 15 march. Infantry brigade commander Col. Rhett; a rich slave owner and dandy largely disliked by his troops (not least of all for the time and effort he spends tracking down and executing men trying to go home); is captured by Union scouts when he mistakenly rides up to them demanding to know Gen. Hardee’s whereabouts. Realizing he is facing infantry; Kilpatrick calls for Gen. Williams to move up elements of his XX Corps and the battle commences the next morning. Hardee; also moving north (to link up with Johnston); has established a defense-in-depth to block Sherman’s left wing. By early afternoon; precise artillery fire; a surprise flank attack by Gen. Case’s brigade; and a heavy frontal attack rout Hardee’s first two lines. William’s troops; however; are checked by stiffened resistance along the 3rd line by late afternoon. As Slocum moves up XIV Corps elements overnight for a decisive showdown in the morning; Hardee slips away. He delays Sherman’s advance a day; but at the cost of relatively high casualties and the loss of artillery pieces.BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE (19-21 March): After weeks of hit-and-run; Hampton dismounts his troopers behind barricades extending on either side of the Goldsboro Road south of Bentonville to allow Johnston to concentrate his infantry behind him. Johnston’s plan is to deploy Gen. Hoke’s infantry as a blocking force across the road in back of Hampton’s line facing west; while hiding the rest of his army along; and north of; the roadway behind thick woods and vegetation; facing south. As Union infantry march east up the roadway; Johnston’s army will spring from the woods onto the columns before they can deploy and destroy the left wing before the right wing can arrive. Union foragers and scouts report Hampton’s resistance is unusually stiff; and some voice suspicions the Confederates are preparing to give battle. But poor intelligence by Kilpatrick has convinced Sherman that Johnston is massing his forces to protect Raleigh to the west; and not Goldsboro. Sherman leaves Slocum a few hours before the battle to join Gen. Howard’s right wing miles to the east; leaving Slocum to sweep aside the cavalry and proceed to Goldsboro.A third of Slocum’s wing (2 divisions) is actually trailing Howard’s right wing; guarding most of Slocum’s wagons carrying wounded and non-combat supplies. Anticipating that any action would likely fall on the left wing and that the right wing was now within adequate support distance—Sherman wanted the left wing unencumbered and fleet-of-foot. However; thanks mostly to Kilpatrick’s intelligence failure; reinforcements will not arrive when Slocum needs them most. Despite this; Johnston’s plan begins to unravel before his attack even begins; and setbacks mount throughout the day.Hampton’s stubborn stand in the early morning has the consequence of bringing Carlin’s lead division out of marching column into battle formation. Hampton retreats as designed; but Carlin; instead of returning to marching formation; separates his brigades and continues on in a wide reconnaissance-in-force that uncovers the hidden infantry; which repulse his probes. Slocum; now convinced he is facing Johnston’s combined forces; orders his remaining three divisions to hurry forward and deploy; and dispatches a series of messages to Sherman.Johnston’s attack; which he hoped to spring in the morning; is delayed until the afternoon as he waits on Hardee (who is using a bad map); then as units reposition; largely due to Carlin’s actions and Bragg’s demand for more troops to support him against the Union right. Johnston sends him Gen. McLaw’s four brigades; despite Hampton’s objections. By the time Johnston orders an all-out attack; Slocum has managed to deploy only two of his four available divisions; but they are enough to stall the initial momentum of the attack; with help from Gen. Bragg. Despite repeated urgings from Johnston; Bragg fails to move; which prompts McLaws to pull his troops out of line and return to Gen. Hardee. But instead of being thrown into the mix to maintain the momentum; they sit idle in the rear until used piecemeal and too late. Bragg’s one hour delay also allows Morgan’s Division of the XIV Corps to improve their defensive works; which are used to good effect to repulse his two subsequent attacks. Ultimately; these compounding factors provide the time necessary for Slocum’s two XX Corps divisions and Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division to arrive on the field and deploy.Subsequent attacks to regain the momentum are uncoordinated and beaten back by Union elements working together. In the center; four brigades under Gen. D. H. Hill rout one of Morgan’s brigades; then converge on the rear of his two remaining brigades; who are now surrounded on three sides with a largely impassable swamp on the other; and no artillery support. With Hill and other senior officers conspicuously absent to coordinate their movements and spur them on; his brigades hesitate to attack; then are further delayed by a call for a truce from a Union Captain. Expectations that the Union brigades are ready to surrender turns out to be a ruse. The delays enable Morgan to turn back Bragg’s final attack in time to reverse sides of their works and turn on Hill’s troops before they attack; while also enabling a XX Corps brigade under Gen. Cogswell to arrive on the field and surprise Hill’s troops on their flank. The combined counterattacks of Morgan and Cogswell rout Hill’s troops; and Cogswell shores up the center.On the Union left; Taliaferro’s and Bate’s divisions under Hardee stop to rest and reform ranks after routing much of Carlin’s Division. Taliaferro then presses forward without Bate and without the support of available artillery or McLaw’s idle troops. His two brigades cross a large open field where they are raked by artillery; and infantry firing into their front and flank; and are turned back at least three times as more Union artillery mass to their front and engage. When Bate does move forward independently near dark; Union fire concentrates on him with the same results. Finally; other than Hampton’s initial delaying action in the morning; his cavalry plays no significant part in the attack. Much of his force is not even on the field; with Wheeler’s units delayed by difficulties fording the Neuse River; and Butler’s shadowing Sherman’s right wing.As darkness descends; Slocum now has all of his available units on the field; including one infantry division and Kilpatrick’s cavalry division that have yet to see action; and Johnston sees the futility in further attacks. He breaks off contact to collect wounded and bury the dead. Confederate casualties number around 2;000; with Union casualties about 1;100. After 9:00 PM; Confederate troops begin pulling away from harassing artillery fire and back to their original jump-off point. In response to Slocum’s messages; Sherman orders most of Slocum’s two divisions trailing the right wing and an additional division of Howard’s to march immediately to his aid up the Goldsboro Road; and orders the remainder of Howard’s Wing to begin marching a few hours later on another route that will fall on Johnston’s left flank.DAY 2: The three divisions arrive in the early morning and deploy along Slocum’s line. As Butler’s and Wheeler’s Cavalry fight a delaying action against Howard’s right wing advancing from the east; Johnston contracts his lines into a tight defensive ring facing east; south; and west; much of it fronted by swamps and supported by artillery. Forward units of Howard’s wing begin arriving around noon and deploy on Johnston’s left; facing west with Slocum’s forces facing north and east. Both sides build on their defensive works amid skirmishing between the lines. Johnston is now heavily outnumbered; and Sherman expects him to retreat that night; but he remains; continuing to fortify. Johnston has used up his offensive capital and is now faced with either retreat—which cedes the Union Army the claim of victory and enables Sherman to continue on to Goldsboro and Richmond—or incite Sherman to attack his fortified lines and hope to exact a heavy toll on him as he did at Kennesaw Mountain. Sherman; having absorbed Johnston’s best blow with less than half of his forces and with no significant damage done; is now confident he can join with Schofield and move on to Richmond with little worry of Johnston impeding him. Seeing no strategic value in attacking his defensive works; he makes plans to leave the battlefield.DAY 3: As Sherman continues drawing up plans to leave; skirmishing continues and Gen. “Fighting Joe” Mower; his division on Johnston’s far left flank; is granted permission for a “little reconnaissance.” He instead pushes his two brigades up a road that leads to Johnston’s rear and towards the critical Mill Creek Bridge; Johnston’s primary means of retreat. The area is protected primarily by cavalry with few fortifications; other than swamps. Johnston is notified of the incursion and responds by shifting troops from other sectors and using Gen. Cheatham’s 1;000 reinforcements just arrived from a two-week journey. But before they can deploy; Mower drives his men through the swamps and routs the cavalry and an artillery battery; and overruns Johnston’s headquarters. Surprised; Johnston and staff; cavalry escort; and Hardee flee without their horses; along with many of Cheatham’s men. But before Mower can proceed to capture the nearby bridge; infantry and cavalry units under Hardee’s direction mount a counterattack; driving him back. Hardee’s elation turns to dread at seeing his only son mortally wounded during his counterattack. Undeterred by the setback; Mower calls for more ammunition and reforms for a second attack. Howard; learning of Mower’s breakthrough; orders two divisions to his support. However; with his mind made up to withdraw and not wanting to bring on a general engagement; Sherman calls off the assault. Johnston; unaware of Sherman’s intentions and recognizing the vulnerability of his army; retreats overnight toward Smithfield.Over the three days; Johnston’s army has incurred at least 2;600 casualties; with Sherman’s around 1;600. As Union troops police the battlefield; they find dead comrades who were captured and then hanged; hacked; stabbed; and/or beaten to death. A local civilian relates witnessing the hacking off of one soldier’s toes; then his legs; before being finished off by bludgeoning. The provost marshal orders increased guards on Confederate prisoners to prevent retribution killings. Johnston messages Lee that he can now do no more than annoy Sherman and to expect Sherman’s arrival; consider abandoning his position; and that his army will be nearby.AFTERMATHSherman pushes on to Goldsboro where he refits his army and combines it with Schofield’s; and meets with Grant and Lincoln at City Point; VA. Grant; now with Sheridan’s cavalry after his clearing of the Shenandoah Valley; believes he can finish the destruction of Lee’s Army without Sherman; and informs him to instead press Johnston.Gen’s Morgan and Carlin received brevet rank promotions for their performance during the battle; and Gen. Mower was promoted to XX Corps commander. Largely because of Kilpatrick’s intelligence failure and for almost losing his command at Monroe’s Crossroads; Sherman tried to replace him with Sheridan; to no avail. After the war; Johnston and Sherman became close friends.CONCLUSION AND AFTERTHOUGHTSMark L. Bradley presents a detailed; polished; and balanced account of the Battle of Bentonville along with bonus material of the Carolinas Campaign; including detailed coverage of the Battles of Averasboro and Monroe’s Crossroads. Much of the compelling narrative is in the words of those on both sides who were there—backed by extensive references and supporting notes. The meticulous research; readability; organization; editing; superior illustrations; and relatively objective analysis make this an outstanding read and historical resource. I’ve read dozens of Civil War books and this work stands out among the very best alongside other masterful works; e.g.; Chris Fonvielle’s “The Wilmington Campaign;” Shea’s and Hess’ “Pea Ridge;” and Timothy B. Smith’s “Champion Hill.”2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. More than Just Bentonville -- An Excellent Scholarly WorkBy David M. DoughertyThe author is to be commended for this work that is auguably the best available on the closing campaign in the Carolinas. It is not actually as long as it appears -- the text is only 414 pages; but the Appendices and notes are also valuable. Since several other reviews are excellent in presenting what the work covers; I shall confine my comments to why I lowered what could have been a 5 star book to only four. Although many of the maps are detailed and helpful; there is a significant lack of maps showing the movements from Savannah to Bentonville. Some actions are difficult to understand since place names in the narrative do not show up on the maps. Nor is there an overall map that would allow the reader to see the battle of Bentonville in its entirety. Some actions are missing altogether such as some of Kilpatrick's skirmishes; and units seem to disappear and reappear like magic in the narrative. What is needed are comments as to their disposition; even when not actually engaged. Also missing is the aftermath of the battle and the negotiations for Johnston's surrender that properly should have been included to conclude the campaign. I also found a great deal of analysis missing; such as Serman's own comment that he missed an opportunity by not supporting Mower to a greater extent. All that being said; this is an excellent work. Sherman's Carolina campaign has not been a major topic in Civil War literature; and this volume was sorely needed. I recommend it to all individuals interested in the Civil War.1 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Great Maps; Sound ResearchBy richard m rocconA well crafted military history. Maps abound! Only one suggestion: follow up this battle with the a treatment of the last two weeks of the war and Joseph E. Johnstons surrender to Sherman.