DOC The Battle for Belorussia: The Red Army's Forgotten Campaign of October 1943 - April 1944 (Modern War Studies (Hardcover)) by David M. Glantz in History

Review

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful. Unique; but still not the final wordBy F. Carol SabinOne of the major “forgotten” battles of WW II; the six-month first campaign in Belorussia is finally restored to the history of Eastern Front in a form of a comprehensive study; which provides a detailed look at the conduct of some “ignored” operations of the Second World War; covered up by Soviet/Russians historians.Based on; largely; newly released Soviet archival materials and some German archives this volume reconstruct these unjustified “ignored” operations in significant detail.In addition; this expertly written narrative of the first attempt to recapture Belorussia offers a rare insight into the Red Army's conduct of the war at the operational-strategic level by Kalinin; Central and Western Fronts along a 600-kilometer front during more than five months of prolonged and costly fighting.The author revealed the two main reasons that eradicated this Belorussian campaign from historical record: first; it was a monumental setback that failed to fulfill the operations’ objectives; and the dishonored relief of one of the three participating front commanders – General Sokolovsky; future minister of defense of USSR in 1950s. To those two we can add a starkly political one: the birthplace (Warsaw) and ethnicity (Pole) of another front commander – General K.K. Rokossovsky; whose imagination and keen operational skills in conducting economy-of-force operations; eclipsed Sokolovsky’s (a pure Russian Slav) incompetence displayed during this campaign.For these reasons; it was a campaign that never happened in Soviet/Russian history and became; instead; another victim of postwar censorship. That failure; plus many more; was masked from public view by other successful operations and also eliminating any stain from Sokolovsky’s public image as high defense official.The volume is consisting of two parts: “The struggle for Belorussia October-December 1943” and “The struggle for Belorussia December 1943 - April 1944” (covering eight and; respectively; 11 previously unknown operations; each presented in an independent chapter).Presenting them in separate chapters; the author made the operations more accessible to the readers; avoiding the colorless prose.As I expected; the book is relatively weak whenever it covers the German side of the campaign; probably from exploring too much from ex-Soviet postwar studies or archive materials and this factor shaped the book in a highly Soviet centric way.In most instances; the book only tells you what the Germans are doing to provide context for the actions of the Soviet army and; frankly; it seemed a bit out of place for me.Between lines; it is clear that the weak and grossly outnumbered German forces won an undisputed victory in all these forgotten operations; keeping much of Belorussia in their hands and inflicting over 700;000 casualties to the Soviet forces. Their impressive performance indicates that even in late 1943 and early 1944; German forces still retained a clear operational/tactical superiority over Soviet opponent through superior leadership and tactics or effective intelligence at all levels. However; their considerable prowess in defense; received very little attention from Dr. Glantz in this study.I was impressed by the chapter 22 (“Investigations; recriminations; and Sokolovsky’s Relief”) in which the author showed the Western Front’s deficiencies during the campaign; mentioned in a commission report (the only official document to have been released about the offensive); and Sokolovsky’s relief.The correction of these deficiencies and the specific lessons learned in the fall and winter of the first Belorussian offensive; plus different weather conditions (that influenced the terrain; made it far better suited to penetration by armor) conditioned the unprecedented success of Operation Bagration – the second Belorussian offensive.A short thoughtful comparison between both Belorussian offensives is the main focus of the last chapter (“Conclusions”); in addition to some last clarifications and assessments.The book includes a large number of maps/situation maps; over 170 bw (an unusual high density); plus 50+ tables and many Soviet illustrations. I noticed a determined effort of the author to make some maps readable and useful to the readers.Worth mentioning are also the Appendices (containing Soviet Directives; Orders and Reports; plus just one German Command Cadre in Eastern Belorussia); Notes and Selected Bibliography sections; plus the Index.Obviously; Dr. Glantz's reconstruction of those failed offensives should fill a gap in our knowledge of WW II; even as it still raises important questions about the reputations of some Soviet national military figures. Moreover; this book opened an important door since the author admitted that “…the complete history of the Battle for Belorussia; October- December 1943; has yet to be told.”All in all; this is one of the best books on the Eastern Front to appear in a good long while and if you're as interested in this field as I am; it's a worthwhile addition to your library. I recommend this study for serious students who are accustomed with Glantz’s writing style.For the historical importance in exposing a great deal that was previously unknown; this book seems destined to remain in a league of its own for years to come.4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. An important part of the War finally presented to the West.By Dave SchranckMr Glantz has done a great service to the west in covering this major campaign. This book fills an important gap in the war (October 43 - April 44) that Stalin and later the Russians didn't want exposed to the public for the results were disappointing and the casualty figures were outrageous - just like Operation Mars. The opening discusses this expungement and the difficulty the author had in reconstructing the campaign.I liked it for another reason as well. This campaign was the forerunner of Operation Bagration that launched in June of 1944. I wanted to compare the two Soviet campaigns and study why this early attack was slow; difficult and costly that ultimately failed many objectives while only a few months later after the end of the first campaign; the second campaign was a complete and utter success. The author covers well the reasons for the lackluster performance in the first but to a large extent leaves the comparison of the two campaigns to the reader.Though there is less battlefield detail like deployments and maneuvers to wade through; the reader will still have to maintain a high focus to get the most out of this book. The campaign quickly became disappointing to the Soviets and Stavka made changes to the command structure as well as to the organization at corps and army levels. Strategy and tactical concerns were also updated. Mr Glantz describes these many changes; making it easier to understand why the Soviets had trouble. The German perspective is not as well covered.Even with the extensive research and the volume of material presented by the author; Mr Glantz warns the reader that this study is not comprehensive and has gaps in the coverage. Though using German material to help fill in some of those gaps; this book is still highly Soviet centric and the reader should be prepared for it.The book is nearly 800 pages long including 200 pages of Appendices; extensive Notes; Bibliography and Index but the level of detail is not as great as one might think. There are also 170+ maps and a number of tables that consume a notable portion of those 600 battle torn pages. While reading this history an appreciation for the level of difficulty that was encountered and overcome by the authors continues to grow as I further study it but it should also be said that "Battle for Belorussia" doesn't have the same level of detail as "Barbarossa Derailed" or the Stalingrad series. (Not a complaint but an acknowledgement of the difficulty of the project.)The book begins by setting the stage of what the eastern front was like in mid 1943 for the Soviets considered this campaign for Belorussia as a continuation of the defense of Kursk for the battle plans were developed alongside the Kursk defense plans in the spring of 1943. Before discussing Belorussia; the deployment of all the Soviet Fronts from the Black Sea to the Baltic is presented; providing their individual strategies. This presentation was highly regarded and made it easier for the reader to understand the backdrop and the significance of the "main event".This large overall campaign for conquering Belorussia consists of numerous smaller campaigns; involving a number of Fronts. Each of these campaigns are covered; starting with a clear backdrop of the Soviet Front involved and its strategy and objectives during the attack. Having a good understanding of what was trying to be accomplished in each campaign made it easier to follow the individual and overall battle history. Commentary and analysis is also provided throughout the book.As usual in Mr Glantz's books there are many bw maps. They can be broken down into three classifications. Original Soviet war maps; original German maps and new composite maps. The first two map classes make up the majority of the maps. Many of these maps are readable but a few are very difficult and have only cursory value. Other maps have Soviet deployments but little German information. The composite maps are new maps and were constructed to replace ill conceived war maps or to cover key areas where original maps couldn't be found.This book clearly shows the dedication and depth of research of the authors as well as the knowledge and understanding Mr Glantz has for the period. I also found it interesting for it allowed me to compare the differences of the two similar overall campaigns. It should definitely be of interest to all students of the War and is highly recommended.2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Another masterpieceBy Carrosio RobertoAnother wonderful book. Most of the readers know the history of the collapse of the Wehrmacht's Army Group Center on summer 1944; but Mr Glantz is the first one to write such a complete history of the battles happened in Belarus and North Ukraine on fall 1943 and winter 1943-44.He is able to give a complete history of the seven months preceding the Operation Bagration; dimonstrating that that huge military success was the final result of a continuous sequence of bloody failures.He is able to integrate new russian sources with old german ones.As usual most of the maps are german almost unreadable ones; but in this book ; at the beginning of each chapter there are even new Russian maps that are really comprehensible.Another true masterpiece that enlightens another forgotten battle.A true masterpiece that enlights another forgotten battle.