audiobook The Defeat of the Luftwaffe: The Eastern Front 1941-45; A Strategy for Disaster by Jonathan Trigg in History

Review

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful. Worthwhile book on the subject of reasons for the demise of Luftwaffe. Not much new information; though.By Bayard B.Not much new information here; I think this subject has likely been beaten to death over the past 70 years. The author does offer some interesting and comprehensive interpretations and conclusions regarding what happened on the Eastern Front and on how the Luftwaffe lost the war. Most of the sources cited in the Notes / Bibliography are secondary; there are very few original German or Soviet / Russian sources. On the other hand; these cited secondary sources include the latest English – language books on the subjects covered; and which in turn were written on the basis of primary German and Soviet archive sources.The other good thing about the book; in my opinion; was that it investigates a wide range of reasons for the demise of the Luftwaffe; it doesn't offer the frequently simplistic single reason for failure.The author does a very good job of relating the numerous factors that caused the demise of the Luftwaffe; especially its decline on the Eastern Front: short – term management of the entire war and industrial effort at the top; inadequate pilot training in terms of both quantity and (after about 1942) quality; inadequate long – term aircraft technical development; and totally inadequate understanding of the effort needed for the Luftwaffe to prosecute a multi – front attritional air war. This list doesn’t even include tactical or local disasters such as winter 1941; Stalingrad in 1942; and the air defense of the Reich throughout 1944 nor aircraft development fiascoes such as the He – 177 and the Me – 210.There are numerous minor errors throughout the book. Fortunately; they are not significant enough to alter the conclusions; but they are irritating and should not have occurred with even a small amount of research. Following is a summary of just a few of them:Page 21: The author states that after the Nazis took power in early 1933; the Germans and the Russians reached an agreement to allow German pilots to train at the Russian air base in Lipetsk. The agreement was made in the early 1920s; several years before the Nazis took power. Hitler and Goering had nothing to do with it.Page 26: The author states that Leon Trotsky was Lenin’s most likely successor. This is far from certain; Lenin never indicated that Trotsky should be his successor. Furthermore; the author states that by the time of Lenin’s death; Trotsky had already been forced into exile and had been murdered. This is totally wrong: Trotsky was not forced into exile until the early 1930s and was finally murdered in Mexico in 1940 -- 16 years after Lenin had died.Page 29: The author states that the Germans gave the Soviet the unfinished heavy cruiser Blucher. This is not correct. The cruiser given to the Soviets was the Lutzow. The Blucher was sunk in Oslo Fjord in April of 1940 during the invasion of Norway.Page 113: it is stated that German production of synthetic rubber (Buna-S) rose from 69 million tons in 1941 to 117 million tons in 1943. Impossible. The units must be wrong. The 69 million and 117 million figures must be in lbs. or perhaps kilograms. By way of comparison; the US production of synthetic rubber in 1944 was around 800;000 tons – and the US was the largest producer of synthetic rubber in the world at the time.Page 145: It is stated that the Italians requested a huge amount of raw material from Germany in 1939 as a condition of Italy entering the war. The list is consistent with what has been published elsewhere; but one conclusion cannot be correct. The author states that the Italian request for 6 million tons of coal amounted to 4 months of Germany’s total coal production. Back on page 112; it is stated that Germany’s annual coal production was around 260 million tons; which I believe is correct. So a demand for 6 million tons of coal would amount to around 8 days of production; not 4 months.Page 219: it is stated that the Soviet (VVS) designation for the American – supplied A – 20 attack bomber was “DB – 7.” This is not quite correct. “DB – 7” was the designation given to the aircraft by its manufacturer; Douglas Corporation (it stood for “Douglas Bomber”). The Soviets tried to purchase airplanes from Douglas in 1941; before the USAAF accepted it as the A – 20. While the VVS sometimes did refer to the aircraft as DB - 7; it was because that was the Douglas designation – not to be confused with the Soviet “DB” designation which was used in the 1930s to indicate “Long Range Bomber.”1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Highly RecommendBy Richard KellyVery well written book....Highly Recommend1 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Very little new information and too much time spent on ...By Gary HolmsVery little new information and too much time spent on the neglect of POWs. Little said about the change of tactics in 1944/45.