From the colonial era to the onset of the Civil War; Magazines and the Making of America looks at how magazines and the individuals; organizations; and circumstances they connected ushered America into the modern age. How did a magazine industry emerge in the United States; where there were once only amateur authors; clumsy technologies for production and distribution; and sparse reader demand? What legitimated magazines as they competed with other media; such as newspapers; books; and letters? And what role did magazines play in the integration or division of American society?From their first appearance in 1741; magazines brought together like-minded people; wherever they were located and whatever interests they shared. As America became socially differentiated; magazines engaged and empowered diverse communities of faith; purpose; and practice. Religious groups could distinguish themselves from others and demarcate their identities. Social-reform movements could energize activists across the country to push for change. People in specialized occupations could meet and learn from one another to improve their practices. Magazines built translocal communities―collections of people with common interests who were geographically dispersed and could not easily meet face-to-face. By supporting communities that crossed various axes of social structure; magazines also fostered pluralistic integration.Looking at the important role that magazines had in mediating and sustaining critical debates and diverse groups of people; Magazines and the Making of America considers how these print publications helped construct a distinctly American society.
#1100277 in Books Noah Feldman 2012-08-26Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.40 x .60 x 5.40l; .60 #File Name: 0691156247232 pagesThe Fall and Rise of the Islamic State New in Paper
Review
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. The Real Islamic State?By MoseyOnThe first thing to point out is that Feldman’s book; published in 2008; is not about the so-called “Islamic State†operating with so much destructive vigor in Iraq and Syria. That organization (if it can be called that) has no claim to the word “state;†and little claim to the word “Islamic.†That it claims both suggests something about its degradation of both politics and religion. Feldman’s book is about the classical; pre-Ottoman Islamic state; its decline under the Ottomans; and the calls from some for the return of a strong presence for Islam in the state today. What he describes is very different from the shrill cries of fundamentalists with a distorted tunnel vision; or the misrepresentations of misinformed or willfully ignorant media commentators.Much of Feldman’s account rests on the position of the class of scholars in the Islamic state. In the traditional Sunni order; he argues; the scholars; operating independently of the executive; were the guardians of the shariʽa. Their expertise in jurisprudence made them an indispensable component in a state and society that depended on shariʽa both for its legal and social norms and for the legitimacy that it granted (or; at least in theory; withheld from) the ruler. The scholars were not the source of the shariʽa; which emanated from God. Rather; they had the exclusive right to interpret the law. They also determined who would be recognized as a scholar with interpretive authority. In other words; they were dominant in questions of both state legitimacy and jurisprudence; checking the executive’s authoritarian tendencies while carefully guarding the prerogatives of their class.The beginning of the end for the shariʽa as the backbone of jurisprudence was the Ottoman constitution of 1876. The crucial developments were the creation of an elected legislature; the appointing of judges outside the exclusive club of scholars; and the codification of law with the accompanying decline in the need for specialized interpreters. Judges became functionaries of state power and the law now emanated from the state rather than existing outside of it. The law no longer authorized the state; but was authorized by it. The end of the traditional Sunni constitutional order and the decline of shariʽa in the late Ottoman empire and in its post-World War I successor states meant that scholars were no longer needed to interpret the law and legitimize the state; and their ability to restrain executive power was effectively gone. The result of the marginalization of both shariʽa and the scholars who had traditionally interpreted and safeguarded it was; more often than not; states with little effective restraint on executive power. And with shariʽa’s role in legitimizing the executive’s rule severely attenuated; the stage was set for the contemporary call for a return of the Islamic state; meaning the re-centering of political and social life on a transcendent law to which not only the people; but their rulers as well are subject.This does not explain the marauding Islamic State of today’s headlines; which appropriates some of the trappings of state structures and Islamic ideology in an attempt to create a veneer of legitimacy for a thuggish regime. Indeed; the calls for the return of a reasonable and balanced Islamic state form are largely drowned out by the brazen actions of those who have hijacked both power and religion. In the end; Feldman argues; what is needed is balance; something which the scholars traditionally provided but which is missing today; at least in the Sunni world. (The class continues today; in somewhat different form; in Shi’i Iran; but Feldman does not hold this up as an example of good or enlightened governance.) Neither the shariʽa itself nor the resurgence of the scholars as its guardian will; by themselves; ensure that the rule of law becomes the norm. To balance the shariʽa as a code of justice; there would have to be institutions powerful and credible enough to ensure that the rule of law does indeed operate to moderate executive power. Scholars are not a magical answer to the problems of majority-Muslim societies; and simply reinstituting their place in a constitutional order will not by itself create the conditions for justice; which is what the call for a return of shariʽa as the law of the land is really after. Any system that can deliver justice—economic justice; social justice—will likely find broad support among those who long for the world they have lost; even if their idealized version of that world never existed. But a state solidly anchored on principles of justice may be the best antidote to the visceral appeal and the raw violence of the pretenders to the legacy of Islamic state-making.My chief criticism is that Feldman is probably quite selective in describing the elements of what he sees as the classical Islamic state. There were undoubtedly variations on the theme he outlines. Furthermore; even if one accepts that what he captures is the core of classical Islamic statecraft; it is unclear how deeply that core resides in the consciousness of those calling for a return to some form of an Islamic state today; even from a very moderate viewpoint. Just look at all the people in the US calling for a “return†to the “ideals of the Founding Fathers†with little understanding of the history of American statecraft and how ideals and reality shaped one another. But for an introduction to the foundations of Islamic statecraft; or to the differences between the headline-grabbing “Islamic State†and historical Islamic states; Feldman’s book is not a bad place to start.4 of 13 people found the following review helpful. Is pretty clear Feldman sees Islam through rose colored glassesBy LLaajaThis guy is very bold in actually going out on a limb and making projections for the success of “Constitutional Islam†and the Arab “springâ€. However two year after Feldman made his prognostications; every one failed to materialize. Is pretty clear Feldman sees Islam through rose colored glasses. Take the glasses off and you get Recep Erdogan or ISIS; take your pick….0 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Very poor scholarshipBy Dr Saqib QureshiAs a piece of scholarship; as a manuscript of academia; this is really very poor. Why? For a start; it's factually often incorrect. The lack of footnotes doesn't help either. The decline of the Caliphate almost definitely didn't start in the late nineteenth century; as suggested by the author; but several centuries prior. Then there's the incoherence of the core argument - there is simply no assessment of the 'fall' and 'rise'. What constitutes a fall and rise of a state; and when did the Caliphate hit those criteria? Finally; the writer is a lawyer .... the subject matter he engages lies somewhere amongst politics; military; economics; sociology; culture and technology (I am thinking about Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of Great Powers). To reduce the fall and rise of a state to only constitutional law (which is what the author does) is nothing short of polemical. It's plain extreme reductivist. I cannot remotely understand how this book got positive reviews speaks on its book cover.
