ebooks The Noise of Battle: The British Army and the last breakthrough battle west of the Rhine; February-March 1945 by Tony Colvin in History

Review

3 of 5 people found the following review helpful. The book contains interesting information but it severely lacked a ...By Howard L. SanduskyThe book contains interesting information but it severely lacked a strong editor. Mr Colvin's coverage of the battles are detailed and interesting especially his skill in consolidating the participant's accounts of the battles. In the second half of the book the author digresses into regimental backgrounds that could have been summarized basically as: The social stratifications in the British army hindered its consistent performance on the battlefield. Likewise Mr Colvin's views on Churchill; Montgomery; the tank divisions; and the RAF's pigheadedness towards battlefield support could likewise have been condensed. As a result; his arguments and analysis flow into diatribes.9 of 9 people found the following review helpful. Interesting; a Bit Unconventional for my Tastes; and Way OverpricedBy Writing HistorianOK; so where can I start. I guess I can begin by stating that I waited for it to become available through third party sellers because I did not want to spend 80 dollars on a kind of obscure topic by an author I hadnt heard of before. I waited until it became available at half price; rationalizing that I could always return it if need be. I am going to keep THE NOISE OF BATTLE; although this book turned out to be nothing like I expected.For one; it is not written by an academic - which I imagined it would be. Tony Colvin is the son of the Battalion 2iC of one of the British infantry units that fought with the 3d British Infantry Division in early 1945 as the 21st Army Group pushed out of Holland into western Germany. His father took him to several of the battlefields described in the book when the author was only eight years old.Colvin's interest in the topic began well over three decades before this book was published. He decided to write this account after reading the British and Canadian official histories who didnt even acknowledge the contributions of the British 3d Division when describing events during this period. From his own father's own stories of the fighting that took place during this period; Colvin knew that the soldiers of that division had been done a great disservice by the official historians. Bit by bit; Colvin began collecting information and interviewing veterans from his father's battalion; brigade; and supporting units such as the 6th Guards Tank Brigade.For reasons unexplained; the manuscript then lay dormant for several decades; though I suspect it might have been because it questioned the events behind several officers receiving allegedly undeserved medals. Those individuals have since passed away.What can you expect from three decades of research? Detail; lots and lots of detail. Perhaps too much in some instances. It is precisely for this reason that the book is 824 pages in length. That said; not all of the detail is associated with the main subject of the book - namely the performance of the 9th British Infantry Brigade in several battles over a multi-week period in February through March 1945.Some of the positive points of having so much information is that tank - infantry cooperation between the 3d Infantry Division and 6th Guard Tank Brigade; as well as several other infantry - armor pairings; is extensively examined. In addition; the author provides very useful material on the late war German airborne forces.Only half of the book; however; deals with the above mentioned subjects. Colvin devotes the remainder to chapter sized sections covering varied topics; to include comparing the Churchill tank with the Sherman; looking at examples of good and bad tank-infantry cooperation in the British Army; bashing British senior generals - both Army and Royal Air Force; casting doubt on the performance of 2d Tactical Air Force and the Hawker Typhoon/Tempest series of aircraft; and a number of other subjects. Sometimes his arguments are well organized and objective; while at other times he is cherry-picking facts and providing his opinion vice reasoned analysis.It all makes for a very interesting book crammed full of good research. You just have to be able to discern where the good research starts and his opinion begins. For the most part; Colvin makes it easy for readers to do just that.In a nutshell; I liked it even though its one of the more eccentric presentations focusing on the late war British Army. There is a lot of fresh; primary source material that a serious reader would find of interest; though the scope is somewhat limited by Colvin's interest in one brigade of a single British division plus its supporting tank unit.Normally I would give an general overview of how the book is organized; but there isn't a contents page up front so I didn't feel like flipping through the entire book attempting to identify where sections began and where they ended. Recommended with reservations.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. using highly unsuitable aircraft in the role like the TyphoonBy mariandavidThe most interesting and controversial part of the book is its second half in which the author takes on some of the long-hidden issues that bedevilled the British Army. Not entirely its fault that it lacked equipment - as the author pointed out making heavy bombers alone for the Royal Air Force used up more production and cost more than was spent on the entire Army; which at least explains if it does not excuse the failure to invest adequately in land warfare technology. He also casts a critical eye on the tactics (speed is all) and the leadership of the British armoured force. And it needs attention - I was not aware that the very generals and brigadiers that failed to support infantry in the desert war; leading to the capture of far too many New Zealand; Indian and British brigades were still in authority in 1945 - serving unbelievably as the senior commanders of armour. Of course it helped that they had connections with both the apostles of mobility (Churchill; Montgomery and Hobart) and with the Court and the Guards. In passing Colvin has mixed feelings about the Guards that were supposed to support the infantry he clearly associates with - courageous; even foolhardy - Guard troop commanders somehow felt that they had to be in the lead tank; unfortunate since the loss of an officer had greater impact in guard units - but also prone to insistence on doctrine.He also has nothing but contempt for the utter inability (or unwillingness) of the Royal Air Force to accept the importance of Ground Support (I am reminded of the current issue of the US Air Force attempting to eliminate the A-10 Thunderbolt II); incapable of accepting specially designed aircraft; notably dive bombers; using highly unsuitable aircraft in the role like the Typhoon; endlessly claiming credit where nothing had been achieved (again Typhoons but with reference to their useless rockets - the statistics showed it took an entire squadron of 16 Typhoons to achieve one hit on a tank; and in the interim 2-4 would be shot down) and above all failing to allow any degree of subordination whatsoever of air units to land commanders.As I say - provocative (and I have passed over the role of Montgomery and his generals) but as said elsewhere harmed by some careless editing and a tendency to ramble - which may also be true of this review.