Without what the Allies learned in the Mediterranean air war in 1942–1944; the Normandy landings—and so; perhaps; the Second World War II—would have ended differently. This is one of many lessons of The Mediterranean Air War; the first one-volume history of the vital role of airpower during the three-year struggle for control of the Mediterranean Basin in World War II—and of its significance for the Allied successes in the war's last two years. Airpower historian Robert S. Ehlers opens his account with an assessment of the pre-war Mediterranean theater; highlighting the ways in which the players' strategic choices; strengths; and shortcomings set the stage for and ultimately shaped the air campaigns over the Middle Sea. Beginning with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia; Ehlers reprises the developing international crisis—initially between Britain and Italy; and finally encompassing France; Germany; the US; other members of the British Commonwealth; and the Balkan countries. He then explores the Mediterranean air war in detail; with close attention to turning points; joint and combined operations; and the campaign's contribution to the larger Allied effort. In particular; his analysis shows how and why the success of Allied airpower in the Mediterranean laid the groundwork for combined-arms victories in the Middle East; the Indian Ocean area; North Africa; and the Atlantic; northwest Europe. Of grand-strategic importance from the days of Ancient Rome to the Great-Power rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the Middle Sea was no less crucial to the Allied forces and their foes. Here; in the successful offensives in North Africa in 1942 and 1943; the US and the British learned to conduct a coalition air and combined-arms war. Here; in Sicily and Italy in 1943 and 1944; the Allies mastered the logistics of providing air support for huge naval landings and opened a vital second aerial front against the Third Reich; bombing critical oil and transportation targets with great effectiveness. The first full examination of the Mediterranean theater in these critical roles—as a strategic and tactical testing ground for the Allies and as a vital theater of operations in its own right—The Mediterranean Air War fills in a long-missing but vital dimension of the history of World War II.
#448592 in Books Glantz; David M./ House; Jonathan M. 2009-04-21Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.30 x 2.10 x 6.50l; 2.55 #File Name: 0700616306678 pages
Review
13 of 13 people found the following review helpful. Impartial;definitive account of combat which preceded StalingradBy Karun MukherjiGlantz and House are scholars par excellence.They have combined to produce another excellent book. Rich and lavishly documented account of combat which preceded the arrival of Wehrmacht on the approaches to Stalingrad.I have read books on Operation Case Blau. Paul Carrel's 'Hitler moves East'gives detailed narration but does not go to the extent of this work. Most Historians have been obsessed with explaining Red army's epic defence of Stalingrad while paying scant attention to operations which preceded it. This book ably fills that void. Authors have thoroughly combed official records of both sides including hitherto neglected sources. As a result they have shed new light which profoundly expands and alters our understanding of the subject.Wehrmacht launched Case Blau on June 28;1942.This was Hitler's bid to seize Stalingrad and oil resources of Grozny ;Maikop in the Caucasus. prelude to it Germans launched a string of preliminary operations: Friedrichus I;II;Wilhelm there by gained additional territory which served as a springboard to unleash their grand offensive. Meanwhile Manstein's 11th army had broken the siege of Sevastopol in Crimea and evicted Soviets from Kerch peninsula: Operation Bustard Hunt.This opened the backdoor to Caucasus but Hitler by shifting Manstein's forces to Leningrad did not exploit opportunity that beckoned him.From Soviet perspective ;Stalin thought Germans in summer of 1942 will renew their bid to seize Moscow. Author's have argued Reichel incident had no effect on Stalin's thinking. Soviet dictator disposed his best forces along the Moscow axis. At the same time he did not shrink from bolstering soviet defences in the south.Authors have divided the Blau operation into 4 phases.Phase 1 was an absolute success.Within a span of 15ays panzer groupings of Armeegroup Weichs and Paulus Sixth army in a pincer move smashed and shattered the armies of Soviet Briansk and Southwestern fronts to reach Voronezh on the western bank of river Don.Phase 2 Hoth's forth panzer armyand army Group As first panzer army completed the encirclement and destruction of soviet forces in the Donbas region.Phase 3 involved fourth panzer army now under the operational command of army group A with 3 of Army group Bs panzer corps co-operating with Kleist First panzer army in outflanking and defeating Soviet southern Front which defended the approaches to Rostov. By this time Hitler had split the army Group South into two:A and B.Fourth phase saw penetration of Wehrmacht into Caucasus;a zone of war again ignored by most historians. Authors focus attention on futile German drive to seize Stalingrad in a rapier-like thrust. Stalin managed to slow the Wehrmacht by erecting a wall of armies along the western bank of Don river.Judging from a strategic perspective Blau operation cannot be deemed an unqualified success.Why? Hitler elated by the fall of Rostov chopped the battle into two halves.He now wanted Wehrmacht to seize Stalingrad and oil resources of Caucasus simultaneously which entailed the dissipation of German strength across a sprawling territory. I feel this ruined the campaign. Splitting of effort resulted in Germans being strong nowhere.Secondly; Red army's ability to raise fresh divisions . As authors point out no sooner Germans smash 25 Soviet divisions another 50 divisions take their place. Sounds startling! Yes;Germans underestimated Russian colossus. You cannot defeat an enemy which keeps raising and fielding fresh armies. It is like trying to tear card pack. You can tear a card but not a card pack.Because pack which is formed by cards protects the card. So quantity generates its own quality.Attrition became so debilitating so much so when Wehrmacht neared key objectives of the operation it had lost its cutting edge.It's precisely here this book makes a radical departure from previous works.Earlier books have emphasized Red Army practising elastic defence when German attack opened. Authors have shown this to be false. Though defeated everywhere Red Army continued to resist stubbornly.Thirdly; Germans lacked strategic air power.This would have made big difference to the campaign. Strategic bombers could have ranged deep and wide behind the Soviet fronts. By bombing railroad networks they could have blocked the movement of red army reserves to the battle zone. Key to German victory lay in isolating the latter from Soviet rear just as allies did in Normandy.Book is divided into 12 chapters. Each chapter is impeccably researched.Back pages contain extensive research notes.Few pages feature charts ;tables showing composition of forces and force ratios.Some pages carry illustrations seen for the first time.My only grudge is about maps few of which look smudged. There is interesting biographical sketch of top Soviet and German commanders.Finally. a word of advice. This book is meant only for serious-minded.Authors say Sixth army reached Stalingrad only in successive spurts. I finished reading it in similar fashion.9 of 9 people found the following review helpful. I Should Love this Book More than I DoBy Ken McCormickI am fascinated by the battle of Stalingrad; and have read most everything I can get my hands on about it. Glantz has produced a masterpiece. It contains a fresh perspective and an ENORMOUS amount of information. There are lots of maps. I should love this book. Instead; I like it; and have enormous respect for the author. But I don't love it.The problem; I think; is information overload. There is so much unit information that paragraph after paragraph is devoted to what is essentially order-of-battle information on every action. If you are looking for that; this book is what you want. If you want a smooth-flowing narrative; you won't find it.The maps are mostly far too small; so I strongly recommend you read the book with a magnifying glass in hand. Otherwise; the maps won't add much.Having said that; Glantz presents a fresh view of the campaign. The Russians fought harder than others have suggested; and did much to wear-down the Germans. It was not a cake-walk followed by a sudden stiffening of resistance. Like everything else in the East; it was hard-fought.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. On to Stalingrad. How the German Heer reached the great city on the Volga in 1942By Michael ReeseDavid Glantz is becoming a better writer. I usually find his books a bit dry and still have trouble with the maps (from German or Soviet sources) he uses but the man does know war on the Russian Front. This book covers the battles that preceded the 1942 German Offensive in southern Russia code named Operation Blue; the execution of Operation Blue and the combat leading up the the Battle of Stalingrad with the Germans holding a toehold on the Volga River as the Russians pulled back into Stalingrad and the German 6th Army closed in on Stalingrad's suburbs. Good reading for Eastern Front historians.
