DOC Yamamoto Isoroku (Command) by Mark Stille in History

Review

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. An insightful look at Japan's most important wartime naval commanderBy Roger J. BuffingtonThis piece is an insightful look at the career of the famed Japanese naval commander Isoruku Yamamoto. Even well-read students of World War II would do well to read this rather short but well-written book; because it contains much about Admiral Yamamoto that many of us do not know. The book explains firstly that Yamamoto had a first-class mind. He placed second in the entire nation of Japan on the entrance requirement to Japan's naval academy. He graduated seventh in his class of 200. There can be no doubt that Yamamoto was a highly intelligent and able man. One interesting tidbit: Isoruku Yamamoto was not born into the Yamamoto family. In accordance with a common Japanese tradition of the times; as an adult he was adopted into that prestigious Japanese family in order that he could carry on that family name as its heir. Although the book gives no information about this; one wonders if this did not help propel Yamamoto's career into the ranks of Japan's Admirals.This piece does much to destroy certain stereotypes of Admiral Yamamoto. It is true that Yamamoto believed that Japan could not and would not win a protracted war with the United States; as he had served in the US as Japan's naval representative and toured American industries. However; in contradiction to this; Yamamoto believed that Japan could not avoid a war with America given Japan's war aims in China and the Pacific. As a result of this latter belief; author Stille explains better than any other author I have read that Yamamoto became almost obsessed with his belief that Japan had to strike first at America at Pearl Harbor to destroy the Pacific Fleet. The author does a good job of pressing his case that Yamamoto became fixated with the notion that a surprise attack against America at Pearl Harbor was essential; and he opposed most of Japan's military establishment on this point. Most of Japan's admirals feared war with America and believed that the strike was too risky and that war with the United States could perhaps be avoided. But through charisma and strength of will; and indeed by threatening to resign; Yamamoto had his way and the rest is history.Author Stille reconciles Yamamoto's belief that Japan could not win a long war with America with his obsession that Japan had to strike at Pearl Harbor by explaining what was perhaps Yamamoto's (and Japan's) greatest miscalculation. Yamamoto believed that a sudden strike at Pearl Harbor which succeeded in destroying most or all of the Pacific Fleet would destroy American morale and cause America to seek a prompt negotiated peace that would allow Japan to keep many of her conquests. (Yamamoto; this book reveals; even believed that in post-attack negotiations that Japan would have to and should give up some of its less critical conquests in exchange for such a negotiated peace.) Obviously Yamamoto's calculation was fantastically wrong; as an enraged United States sought and got an unconditional Japanese surrender.This book is further unkind to Yamamoto by making a strong case that Yamamoto failed to appreciate the lesson that he himself taught the world at Pearl Harbor: that the day of the battleship was done and that aircraft carriers were the true capital ships of the World War II era. America's Admiral Nimitz understood this; and reminded Yamamoto of this truth by decisively defeating Japan at the Battle of Midway. This battle; which Yamamoto planned and led; ended Japan's hope of any kind of victory in the Pacific. Further; the author criticizes Yamamoto's leadership in the Guadalcanal campaign. The author makes the point that instead of concentrating Japan's forces to drive the Americans out of Guadalcanal; Yamamoto instead committed Japan's resources piecemeal; allowing this campaign to chew up Japanese men and ships in a kind of Stalingrad of the Pacific. Japan; with its far smaller war potential; could not afford to engage in a war of attrition against America and yet this is exactly what happened at Guadalcanal: Japan won many battles at the tactical level (most notably the Battle of Santa Cruz) but ultimately lost the campaign. By contrast; Admiral Halsey committed every resource America could muster; both naval and military; to ultimately achieve victory by a determined application of the military maxim of "Concentration of Force."The author's ultimate thesis is that Yamamoto was a highly intelligent; able; and exceptional leader but not a great naval commander by virtue of his lack of strategic vision (the attack on Pearl Harbor) and the fact that he was responsible for Japan's critical loss at the Battle of Midway through bad tactics and a flawed battle plan. Each reader can judge for him or her self whether this is a fair evaluation of Japan's premier Admiral. I am inclined to believe that the author makes his case. In any case; this rather short but incisive piece is worthy of attention. Highly recommended. RJB.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Mark Stille's books always provide an excellent analysis of leaders and battlesBy James Davis (jdavismaj@hotmail.com)Mark Stille's books always provide an excellent analysis of leaders and battles. Although his books are shorter; they are always packed with penetrating insights and succinct dissections of the flaws or adroitness of different commanders and their strategies. I am a great student of the War in the Pacific in WWII and have read many books on it and on Admiral Yammamoto. As always with Commander Stille's works I am always introduced to perspectives and operational analysis that I have never before. In Yammamoto's case Stille points out several instances of irony and lots of myth busting about Yammamote but also provides a good overview of Yammamoto the man. Well worth the read.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Gave an excellent understanding of the conflicted planner of the Pearl Harbor ...By Carl SteinhouseGave an excellent understanding of the conflicted planner of the Pearl Harbor attack; particularly when he strongly opposed a war with the United States.